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Call Market Experiments: Efficiency and Price Discovery through Multiple Calls 
and Emergent Newton Adjustments 
Charles R. Plott† and Kirill Pogorelskiy†† 
Abstract 
We study multiple-unit, laboratory experimental call markets in which orders are cleared by a 
single price at a scheduled “call”. The markets are independent trading “days” with two calls 
each day preceded by continuous and public order flow. Markets approach the competitive 
equilibrium over time. The price formation dynamics operate through the flow of bids and 
asks configured as the “jaws” of the order book with contract execution structured by an 
underlying mathematical principle, the Newton method for solving systems of 
equations.  Thus, both excess demand and its slope play a systematic role in call market price 
discovery. 
JEL codes: C92, D44, D47, D58, G14 
Keywords: call market, exchanges, experiments, order flow, dynamics, market jaws, market 
microstructure, Newton 
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Call Market Experiments: Efficiency and Price Discovery through Multiple Calls and 
Emergent Newton Adjustments 
Charles R. Plott† and Kirill Pogorelskiy†† 
1 Introduction 
This paper studies the principles that govern the behavior of a market exchange system based 
on call market price discovery and settlement. Call markets accumulate orders until a 
scheduled time at which a “call” takes place, a single market-clearing price is determined, and 
all exchanges take place at that price. Accumulation of orders over time creates “market 
depth”, which can conceivably lead to reducing the price variability. By contrast, the widely 
used continuous double auctions are founded on a different architecture in which order flow 
takes place continuously and the timing of contract executions is endogenous and possibly at 
different prices.  
The call markets studied are organized as an exchange in which agents have multiple units. 
The analysis is restricted to the “pure case” of price discovery that is not complicated by agent 
uncertainty about the personal value of the traded item.  Thus, complexities of asymmetric 
information, common values, winner’s curse, incomplete markets, and other issues central to 
the operation of information aggregation in markets are not studied.1 The underlying flow of 
incentives to trade arrives in a series of independent periods that include an unannounced 
structural shift in the market parameters.  A period is like a trading day in which two calls 
occur, prices are determined and exchanges take place.   
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1
 Many studies and a long history of research exist on the relationship between information aggregation and 
institutions. Experimental environments studied range from multiple states and multiple markets (Arrow-Debreu 
securities), and single markets (winner's curse), to cascades and bubbles. The institutions range from various 
forms of continuous double auctions, call markets, quote markets, dealer markets, auctions (sealed bid, 
ascending price, etc.) and special mechanisms designed explicitly for the purpose of information aggregation. 
Our focus is on call markets with independent values about which there is no uncertainty. Even with the focus so 
restricted a substantial range of institutions exist. 
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The paper explores principles governing price discovery and dynamics in call markets. 
Specifically, the three broad questions are: (i) Do the basic laws of supply and demand 
operate as they are known to operate in continuous markets? (ii) What are the behavioral 
principles that guide the price dynamics? (iii) How do the institutions and rules, together with 
behavioral principles operate to guide market performance? 
Unlike the continuous double auction, the call mechanism does not permit the continuous, 
non-linear adjustment of market prices to order flow, so adjustment to parameter changes 
might be slow and create inefficiencies. In essence, the same features that reduce price 
variability might work to inhibit market adjustment to parameter changes.  Price variability 
can be related to possible changes in the underlying structure but also possibly related to thin 
markets caused by the asynchronous arrivals of buy and sell orders.2 The experiments are 
designed to provide insights about the role the key call market architectures features in 
determining market performance.  
Our results demonstrate that in the two-call, multiple-unit auctions market prices converge to 
the competitive equilibrium derived from the underlying incentives. Volume falls short of the 
equilibrium level, but the difference is small. Efficiency is relatively high, increases over time 
and converges to near the competitive equilibrium level.  Results are robust to the presence 
of a structural shift in the market parameters. 
The results provide insights about a long-standing mystery of how markets achieve an 
equilibrium defined as a solution to the equations created by the underlying incentives. An 
interpretation is that the market “discovers” the solutions to a system of equations that no 
one in the market knows. A detailed study of the market dynamics suggests that two separate 
processes shape and coordinate price “discovery” and efficient trades. Price formation is 
initiated by the flow of buy and sell orders that become organized by the institutions into a 
configuration we will call the “market jaws”. At a “market call” the organized orders are acted 
on by a computational, price determination process that computes a market-clearing price 
given the buy orders and sell orders. Together they act as if they are guided by the Newton 
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 If few trading counterparties exist when a trader wanting to trade a large volume appears in the market, the 
market price movements and variability will reflect the underlying asymmetry as the executions move through 
the order book. Of course, price fluctuations due to asynchronous arrivals of buyers on one side and sellers on 
the other might be smoothed by market depth added by speculation.  
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method of finding the solutions to a system of equations.  To emphasize the combined model, 
we will refer to the model of the price discovery process as “Newton-Jaws”. We feel 
compelled to warn the casual reader that this model has nothing to do with the jaws of the 
outstanding mathematician and physicist, Sir Isaac Newton, after whom the mathematical 
computational method is named. 
In the environment we study the market parameters are substantially the same from period 
to period. The model describes the formation process as working within a period through the 
multiple calls to create a series of steps of information aggregation and computation leading 
to price changes and then to ultimate convergence across periods. The model begins with the 
order flow becoming organized as “market jaws” that reveal the slopes of the underlying 
demand and supply functions. Order arrival rates approximate the excess demand. The call 
market price determination process then becomes a computational feature. Together when 
operating in the multiple calls, the mechanisms approximate a Newton method of finding 
price movements over a series of periods that result in the solution of the underlying demand 
and supply equations.  
Walrasian adjustment, the main alternative to Newton-Jaws, also finds support, but Newton-
Jaws performs better by comparison. Simulations with zero-intelligence agents demonstrate 
that Newton-Jaws model has a solid foundation: it is a property of the call market institution 
(together with underlying demand/supply parameters) rather than a consequence of special 
or idiosyncratic features of traders' strategic behavior. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Subsection 1.1 provides a brief review of 
the background literature. Section 2 describes the experimental economic environment. 
Subsection 2.1 presents the call market institution we implemented in the lab. Subsections 2.2 
and 2.3 describe our experimental procedures and the basic parameters, respectively. Section 
3 describes models and theory behind their application to the actual data. Section 4 presents 
our main results. Section 5 concludes. Appendix A contains additional estimation details, while 
Appendix B contains experimental instructions.  
1.1 Background and Related Literature 
Call markets share institutional features with many other types of markets.  The term “call 
market” or “clearing house” is typically reserved for a complex class of institutions with a 
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designated time for tenders and simultaneous price discovery, operating in environments with 
multiple buyers and sellers. This class of institutions is large. For example, auctions, including 
any form of sealed bid, can be viewed as special cases of call markets with a single seller (or 
buyer).   
Major institutional differences aside, the principles that govern the behavior of call markets 
potentially have broad applications and motivate questions that run through several decades 
of experimental research. Experimental attention was drawn to similar institutions by the 
discovery3  that a posted price process exhibits different efficiency and price performance 
than the continuous double auction. The subsequent, overarching literature represents a 
meticulous exploration of blends of call markets and the continuous double auction that has 
led us to the experiments and models developed here. Cason and Friedman (1997) nicely 
summarize the issues: “The general question of price formation thus resolves into three 
research questions. What are the relevant market institutions? What are the equilibrium 
properties of such institutions? And to what extent do human traders come to approximate 
the equilibrium outcomes?” 
The experimental focus was first drawn to periodic call markets by Smith et al (1982), who 
observed that call market prices demonstrated a convergence process in a repetitive, 
stationary environment with multiple units.  Price convergence was slow relative to 
continuous markets; the ultimate efficiency was below but comparable to the continuous 
double auction.  McCabe, Rassenti, and Smith (1993) studied performance of call markets with 
differing features, including multiple units, open/closed book, freedom to modify or cancel (at 
a cost) orders during bid tenders,  different call and pricing rules and different order 
submission rules.4 Similar to the earlier work, they observed convergence fell short of the 
competitive equilibrium.  Why convergence was slow and what changes might make it faster 
were open questions that emerged from the work.  
Guided by the theoretical development of Wilson (1987) and Satterthwaite and Williams 
(1993), the experimental work of Friedman (1993), Cason and Friedman (1997), and Kagel 
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 See Plott and Smith (1978). 
4
 Their research was motivated by the rule used in the Arizona stock exchange (1992-2001) and by an interest in 
isolating procedures and rules that might enhance the performance of call markets. 
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(2004) explored principles of call market price formation under very strong conditions that 
allowed a test of the Bayes Nash Equilibrium model.  Presumably, a better understanding of 
the details of bidder behavior would produce insights about the behavior of the system.5 The 
environment included a closed book during bid tenders, a one-unit restriction on individual 
preferences, randomly changing costs and values, and price determination rules that provided 
a clear view of individual strategies. Their experiments produced systematic deviations from 
the Bayes Nash Equilibrium model and the patterns they observed motivated a conjecture 
that a learning aspect was needed. Models based on exposed decision errors and missed 
trades seemed promising. Such models were consistent with behavior observed in second 
price auctions by Garvin and Kagel (1994), and also by Cason and Friedman (1999).  
Suggestion of a learning process in the randomly changing environment led naturally to a 
question about whether having multiple calls in a single period would lead to the emergence 
of price convergence and efficiency.  Cason and Freidman (1999b, 2008) investigated this 
possibility with a mechanism they called the Multiple Call Market. They explored the question 
in a “thin” markets environment, which classical theory suggests is extremely challenging, 
especially for the study of delicate strategic relationships. They observed substantial 
inefficiencies that they attribute to the thin markets. 
A natural question motivated by the Cason and Friedman experiments is whether or not 
thicker markets with public (open) book, bid adjustment flexibility, and multiple calls will 
enhance call market performance.  The issue receives some support from the experiments of 
Cason and Plott (1996) who study call markets in a replicating environment with individual 
bidder incentives determined at random.  When viewed from one call to the next, the 
replicating environment has coordination and information similarities to those of multiple 
calls within a period. Cason and Plott observe both efficiency and price convergence to near 
competitive equilibrium levels. More importantly, they also reported value revelation of extra 
marginal units, which is directly related to the role that value revelation of marginal and extra 
marginal units can play in forming a process of convergence when market environments are 
repeated across periods. The importance of the revelation of marginal and extra marginal unit 
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 See also Friedman and Ostroy (1995) who investigated several equilibrium models in a quantity-only call market 
they called CHQ. 
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values appears in the theoretical work of Easley and Ledyard (1993) which predicts that the 
end-of-period price in the continuous time double auction contains key information for the 
next period in a period-to-period adjustment process. This end-of-period activity is also 
underscored in the results of Jamison and Plott (1997) who observed that bids and asks in the 
closing moments of a continuous double auction indeed played the fundamental role in price 
discovery as predicted by Easley and Ledyard.  
The data patterns suggest the existence of systematic principles guiding the market behavior. 
The existence of multiple units and heterogeneous agents in call markets challenges the 
development of an appropriate Bayes Nash Equilibrium model.  A natural alternative 
approach involves taking dynamics into account and using classical economics tools and 
results found in the literature. A connection between excess demand and price changes was 
established early (Smith, 1965). A connection between prices and order flow as represented 
by excess bids (i.e., total buy orders minus total sell orders) was established later (Smith, 
Suchanek, and Williams, 1988), leading to a long-standing challenge to understand the 
mechanisms at work. That work as well as Selten and Neugebauer (2014) find substantial 
support for the excess bids model as a predictor of prices. Their analysis leaves open the 
question of whether or not the excess bids model is more accurate than the classical excess 
demand model or the Newton-Jaws model developed below, and what might be the source of 
its accuracy in predicting price changes.  
Studying the market adjustments in response to an unstable competitive equilibrium, Plott 
and George (1992) demonstrated that a special type of call market with price changes 
responding to bids and asks through a Newton-Raphson secant mechanism (a “smart” market) 
converges to the nearest Walrasian stable competitive equilibrium.6 This discovery re-
emphasizes the role of excess demand in determining price adjustment but also the central 
role of the excess demand slopes in the price discovery process, and thus the importance of 
excluded bids and asks in approximating those slopes. The insight becomes enhanced with the 
idea that the excluded bids and asks in the continuous double auction, captured by the order 
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 Gjerstad(2013) studied the price dynamics in a continuous double auction, and used a Hahn stochastic process 
to estimate disequilibrium price adjustment within a period, which is an alternative approach to modeling the 
dynamics.  
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book shape, perform the same function. The jaw-type structure of the order flow recorded in 
the order book is related to the rules governing the order book for continuous, multiple-unit 
double auctions.7 That possibility was illustrated by Asparouhova, Bossaerts, and Plott (2003), 
and formalized by Bossaerts and Plott (2008) as the market “jaws”: a Newton adjustment 
process based on the jaw-shaped order book could contribute to price convergence in the 
continuous double auction.8 Whether a Newton-Jaws type adjustment operates in a discrete, 
multiple-call market environment has not been investigated until now. 
The call market exchange we explore in this paper incorporates several features shown to be 
important in the literature. The exchange consists of multiple (two) calls in each of a series of 
periods replicated under stationary market demand and supply schedules. The order book is 
open so all participants can view the order flow and the tentative price, which is continuously 
computed and displayed. Following the rules of the call market that has become known as the 
uniform price double action (UPDA) as introduced by McCabe, Rassenti, and Smith (1993), 
bids and asks can be tendered, adjusted or cancelled at any time during the order submission 
period. After a call, each participant sees the volume, own transactions, and the untraded bids 
and asks, which remain in the book as is the case with the Cason and Friedman rules. Markets 
are not thin in the sense of Cason and Friedman since agents have multiple units and there 
are typically more than ten buyers and ten sellers. Given previous experiments and theory, all 
of the features suggest that we should observe price discovery and efficiency convergence.  
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 The definition and rules as first developed by Plott and Grey (1990) use price/time priority for listing in the 
book. Subsequent computerized markets such as MUDA (Johnson, Lee, and Plott,1988) and the more advanced 
Marketscape (for a 1997 animation illustrating the jaws dynamics of the order flow using Marketscape visit 
http://eeps.caltech.edu/mov/jaws.html) made a graphical representation of the data available to traders in real 
time. Sell orders are listed from low to high, with the lowest ask the first to trade, and according to increasing 
price quotes, giving the orders in the book an upward slope. Similarly, the buy orders are listed from high to low 
thereby creating a downward appearance. Buy orders that “cross” the market as a result of the buy order priced 
above sell orders, trade at the lowest-price sell quotes listed in the book and crossing sell orders trade with the 
highest-price buy order quotes. Orders involved in contracts are removed from the book and units untraded in 
multiple-unit orders remain on the book. Thus, at any instant the book reveals the untraded orders and has the 
appearance of an upper jaw comprised of sell orders and a lower jaw comprised of buy orders thereby providing 
information about the state of excess demand at the existing price. Orders in the book can be cancelled at any 
time thereby creating a “movement” of orders jockeying to be in a position of potential trade. Traders with limit 
prices removed from the current market prices have an incentive to use a “best shot” strategy and reveal their 
limit value to increase the chance their order will trade.  
8
 A Newton-based adjustment process was tested and rejected for the continuous double auction when 
operating in an environment with unstable equilibria. See Hirota et al (2005). 
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The experimental questions are whether convergences indeed occur and if so, what dynamic 
model can approximate the process. 
Our results demonstrate the existence of a price formation process that embodies the logic of 
the Newton method of solving systems of equations. It thus builds on and extends the 
previous results. The information used in price formation exists in the order flow and 
encompasses both the information contained in the excess demand and the information in 
the excess bids (i.e., total buy orders minus total sell orders). However, additional information 
about the separate slopes of the demand and supply functions is supplied by the “jaws”: the 
values of the excluded bids and asks. This information is used by a Newton-like process of 
price formation and discovery.  
There is a growing interest in call markets applications inspired by the possibility that call 
markets can be useful supplements to other forms of markets. While such possibilities raise 
basic science challenges far beyond the questions posed here, introducing the respective 
connections puts the research reported here in a broader context. Budish, Cramton, and Shim 
(2015) argue that call markets might avoid difficulties caused by high-speed trading.  Brewer, 
Cvitanic, and Plott (2013) suggest call markets as a tool to deal with flash crashes that might 
occur in continuous markets.  The Euronext and Xetra exchanges use call markets combined 
with other forms of markets to open and close trading based off the theory that it improves 
price discovery.9 A completely different approach is taken by Selten and Neugebauer (2014), 
who attempt to create phenomena reported in the finance literature as “puzzles” in the 
laboratory.  Notwithstanding the design differences, they also find support for the predictive 
model of price formation based on excess bids, the number of buy orders minus the number 
of sell orders. They argue that path dependence between current and past excess bids, i.e., 
the adaptive model of price formation, operates at the individual level, while in our 
experiment this mechanism is eliminated by book clearing at the end of each period. See also 
Selten and Neugebauer (2015), who compare call markets and double auctions, and report 
the call markets as less effective.  They do not explore variations of the two institutions or 
isolate the principles that seem to be operating. 
                                                          
9
 See Hoffmann and van Bommel (2011). 
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What form a call market should take to meet these challenges, how they would perform or 
what forms the theory might take to unravel the challenges presented by field observations 
are beyond the scope of this paper. 
2 Environment 
In this section, we describe the experimental call markets implemented in the laboratory. 
2.1 Institution, Rules and Timing  
The call market we study is based on a double auction design in which both bids to buy and 
asks to sell are tendered. Unlike the continuous time double auction, trades only happen at a 
call. Before the start of the experiment, the subjects are designated as buyers or as sellers, 
which they keep for the entire experimental session. Each session consists of several periods, 
developed as follows. 
Before the start of a period, costs and redemption values are induced. Costs are distributed in 
terms of buy orders from the experimenter to the sellers (who would buy from the 
experimenter and resell to buyers) and redemption values are distributed in terms of sell 
orders from the experimenter to the buyers (who would buy from sellers and resell to the 
experimenter). These incentive-based orders are placed in a private market accessible only by 
the subject for whom they are intended. No inventories in terms of units or orders are carried 
over from period to period. 
A public (trading) market opens at the beginning of each period. In this public market, two 
calls are performed each period. The first call is 1.5 minutes into the period and the second is 
4.5 minutes into the period (3 minutes later), leaving 1.5 minutes to redeem units purchased 
or return unsold units to the experimenter when no more calls remain in the period.10 
At any time during the period, sellers can place sell orders and buyers can place buy orders to 
the public market. Orders are ranked (buy orders from high to low and sell orders from low to 
high) according to the execution mechanism, should a call take place. The orders are 
published on a screen so any trader can see everyone’s orders in the sequence of potential 
                                                          
10
 The last 1.5 minutes of a period were unnecessary for the call market functioning, but allowed the subjects to 
learn the outcome of the second call trade and manually convert their units on hand into francs if they wished to 
do so. As a convenience feature, the software automatically converted all units on hand into francs at the end of 
the period using traders’ true value and cost schedules. 
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executions. Orders are also displayed in the graphical form by means of demand and supply 
curves based on the current order book. Orders can be cancelled and re-submitted at any 
time before the call so the curves and prices can shift around before the call. No constraints 
are placed on orders except by limiting the number of units to 6. Subjects are allowed to 
tender potentially unprofitable offers.  Thus, the technology allows subjects to attempt to 
manipulate the price. The number of orders a subject can have simultaneously placed on the 
public market at any given time is limited by the number of units made available by the 
experimenter. 
At each call, all buy and sell orders in the order book are simultaneously considered and a 
market price is established. It is determined as follows: 
1. Based on all orders in the book, the system sorts buy orders by their respective prices per 
unit from high to low. Sell orders are sorted by their respective prices per unit from low to 
high. 
2. The system matches two sorted series selecting all pairs for which the purchase price is 
greater than the sale price, and stops at the last pair for which this is true. 
3. The market price is calculated midway between the last accepted (the lowest filled) buy 
order and the last accepted (highest filled) sell order. Except for ties, all buy orders with prices 
above the market price will trade at the market price. All sell orders with prices below the 
market price will trade at the market price. All other orders will remain unfilled.11   
Participants have profits continuously updated. A history of all trades up to the current time is 
always available. Remaining orders in private markets are always displayed. Untraded units 
are returned to the experimenter at the private market price at the end of each period. 
2.2 Experimental Procedures 
Subjects were recruited from Caltech and Purdue University. In total, 123 subjects 
participated. Upon sign-up for the experiment, subjects received an email with the hyperlink 
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In general, the competitive equilibrium market price can be defined as follows. Let z be an index of buy orders 
(bids) ordered from high to low and sell orders (asks), ordered from low to high. Thus, z is an index of ordered 
pairs (b(z),a(z)), where b(z) is the bid, and a(z) is the ask of the z
th
 pair. Let z* be the smallest z for which b(z+1)< 
a(z+1). Thus z* is the index of the "last trade", the last accepted bid and the last accepted ask. The competitive 
equilibrium price is any p*>0 such that  
(i) For z  z*, b(z)  p* and a(z)  p*; and (ii) p*  [max {b(z*+1) , a(z*)}, min {b(z*), a(z*+1)}] 
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to the actual experiment webpage, instructions, and the demo. We also recorded and 
uploaded a short video describing the details of the experiment using the software interface.12 
The instructions are available in Appendix B. Subjects were paid by check after the end of the 
session. In all sessions, subjects made decisions via Internet using a web browser. Each session 
had 18 to 19 periods and lasted about 2 hours. Subjects were not informed about the last 
period unless it was over. Subjects were told that the experimental session would last about 
two and a half hours.  
The first three periods were practice periods using a specially designed set of parameters that 
allowed low gains and low losses. Subjects were told that the first three periods were 
designed to help them understand how the software worked. Subjects were instructed that if 
they failed to make a profit in the first three periods to demonstrate their understanding of 
the trading system, they would receive a show-up payment but would not be used in the 
experiment. A frequent mistake was related to thinking that they should exercise all orders 
found in their private order books, e.g., sell all units they could independently of profitability. 
Subjects were randomly assigned as buyers and sellers, and their types were fixed during the 
session. However, buyer redemption values and seller costs were changed once after the 
practice and once after a parameter shift, as explained below. Subjects could submit buy and 
sell, multiple-unit orders in a public market and redeem their values and costs from the 
experimenter using their private values/costs markets. 
Table 1 presents the summary of the experimental sessions. 
Table 1: All experimental sessions  
Session 
no. 
Date Practice, 
Periods 
Pre-
shift, 
periods 
Post-
shift, 
periods 
Initial 
subjects 
Paid 
Subjects 
Average 
Payoff, $ 
Exchange 
rate  
1 2012-05-11 3 8 8 17 14 45.21 1f=3.5 cents 
2 2012-05-12 3 8 8 13 13 48.85 -- 
3 2012-12-01 4 7 7 15 15 36.13 -- 
4 2012-12-13 3 8 8 17 17 41.06 -- 
5 2013-02-23 3 8 8 21 19 34.79 1f=2.5 cents 
6 2013-03-02 3 8 8 21 21 37.38 -- 
7 2013-05-16 3 7 7 19 17 30.59 -- 
Notes.  After end of practice and after shift, all types were rotated.  
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 The video is available at http://tinyurl.com/kcq6pmb.  
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All values, costs, and prices were specified in experimental currency called “francs”. Subjects’ 
earnings in francs were exchanged into US dollars at the end of the experiment. Subjects were 
paid by checks mailed to the addresses they specified at the sign-up. Average earnings were 
$19.57 per hour. 
2.3 Basic Parameters 
We chose the basic parameters in the experiment to satisfy a wide range of criteria implied by 
our focus on convergence and market dynamics. In sessions 1-4, we used three types of 
buyers and three types of sellers, where each subject's type defines her private costs/values. 
In sessions 5-7, we used five types of buyers and five types of sellers. Table 2 contains the 
costs and values for all our setups. In all sessions, we also implemented a parameter shift 
around period 9 after the end of practice. The shift increased all costs and values by the 
specified amount of francs. Types were rotated after the parameter shift. Figure 1 illustrates 
the main features of the experimental call market. 
Table 2: Experimental parameters 
 
Sessions Types Private values/costs per unit, francs Shift 
  Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 Unit 4 Unit 5 Unit 6+  
1-4 B1 210 195 190 155 150 120 75 added to 
 B2 220 200 175 165 145 115 each unit 
 B3 215 195 185 160 140 125  
 S1 120 150 155 175 195 205  
 S2 115 145 165 185 200 210  
 S3 125 140 160 180 190 215  
5-7 B1 250 208 203 170 144 120 83 added to 
 B2 246 213 199 165 140 118 to each unit 
 B3 242 218 195 160 133 115  
 B4 238 224 190 155 130 112  
 B5 234 230 186 150 125 110  
 S1 110 150 155 185 214 235  
 S2 115 146 160 190 218 240  
 S3 120 142 165 195 222 245  
 S4 122 137 170 204 226 250  
 S5 126 132 174 209 230 255  
Notes.  Types indicators correspond to (B)uyers and (S)ellers.  All sessions included 3-period practice 
with different test parameters.  After end of practice and after shift, all types were rotated. 
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Figure 1: Call price dynamics in the experiment on 2013-03-02. Call prices shown are the actual prices 
from the experiment. Equilibrium period prices, which can differ from experiment to experiment due 
to different numbers of participants, are averages over all our experiments. 
 
The left panel of Figure 1 shows the time series of the average price (averaged across all 
experiments) at each call of each normalized period (after the practice). We see how on 
average prices converge to the competitive equilibrium up to period 9, when the upshift of 
equilibrium price by about 80 francs takes place, which resets the convergence anew. 
The right panel of Figure 1 depicts the order book in a particular experiment (session 6), 
period 11. We see the demand and supply computed based on true values and costs used in 
that period, as well as the revealed demand and supply based on the order flow, the buy 
orders (bids) and sell orders (asks) in the book for the two calls. The patterns of the orders in 
the book resemble a “hockey stick” with the handle appearing flat and near the market price 
and the blade at angles reflecting and approximating the relative values of excluded units.  
The revelation of the marginal and extra-marginal units is crucial for the price dynamics, as we 
demonstrate below. These revealed units taken together will be called the market “jaws” – an 
open mouth ready to bite. 
3 Models  
This section introduces several models estimated in Section 4. Subsections 3.1 and 3.2 
describe a dynamic model developed to capture the notion of convergence to the competitive 
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equilibrium and the underlying market efficiency. Subsection 3.3 describes the market “jaws” 
as a form of revelation of traders' commitments and strategies. Subsection 3.4 introduces the 
Newton method of finding a solution to a set of equations describing the price adjustment 
across calls in a period, and how it facilitates price discovery through the mechanics of the call 
market institution. 
3.1 Convergence to the Competitive Equilibrium 
We use a simple dynamic model to assess convergence to the competitive equilibrium. The 
basic idea is to establish whether the difference between the data and the corresponding 
equilibrium goes to a common asymptote of zero as periods in an experiment proceed. The 
model was developed by Noussair, Plott, and Riezman (1995). 13  
The original model is modified to account for a shift in parameters that occurs after the first 
several periods. The model for price convergence is as follows. 
𝑝𝑖𝑡 − 𝑝𝑖𝑡
∗ = (
𝛼?̃?1𝛿1
𝑡 − 𝑡1 + 1
+
𝛽1
𝑡
) 𝑑1 + ⋯ + (
𝛼?̃?𝑖𝛿𝑖
𝑡 − 𝑡𝑖 + 1
+
𝛽𝑖
𝑡
) 𝑑𝑖 + ⋯ 
+ (
𝛼?̃?𝐾
𝛿𝐾
𝑡−𝑡𝐾+1
+
𝛽𝐾
𝑡
) 𝑑𝐾 + 𝛾 (1 −
1
𝑡
) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡        (1) 
where 𝑖 indexes experimental market sessions; 𝑡 indexes periods in a session starting from 1; 
𝑝𝑖𝑡 is the average market price in period 𝑡 of experimental market session 𝑖; 𝑝𝑖𝑡
∗  is the 
equilibrium market price in period 𝑡 of the same session; 𝐾 is the total number of 
experimental sessions (we ran 7); 𝑑𝑖, 𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝐾} is a dummy variable corresponding to 
experimental session 𝑖; 𝛽𝑖 is the origin of the corresponding time series; ?̃?𝑖 indexes the period 
when the parameter shift14 occurs in session 𝑖; 𝛼?̃?𝑖  is a dummy variable that corresponds to 
the shift, i.e., 𝛼?̃?𝑖 = 0 for 𝑡 < ?̃?𝑖, and 𝛼?̃?𝑖 = 1 for 𝑡 ≥ ?̃?𝑖; 𝛿𝑖 captures the “new origin” effect, 
created by the shift; 𝛾 is the asymptote of the series common to all experimental sessions; 
and, finally, 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is a random error. 
The same equation with 𝑝𝑖𝑡 − 𝑝𝑖𝑡
∗  replaced by 𝑞𝑖𝑡 − 𝑞𝑖𝑡
∗  is used to estimate volume 
convergence. 
                                                          
13
 Noussair, Plott, and Riezman named it the AElG model after Orley Ashenfelter and Mahmoud El-Gamal whose 
suggestions led to the development of the model.  
14
 In our experiments, most shifts occurred in the 9-th period following the practice period. 
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The basic idea behind this dynamic model is as follows. In experimental market session 𝑖, the 
difference between the data and the competitive equilibrium starts from some random origin, 
captured by 𝛽𝑖, and moves closer to the common asymptote 𝛾 as time (i.e., period number) 
increases from 1 to the time of the parameter shift, if there is convergence. At the time of the 
shift  𝑡 = ?̃?𝑖, the term 
𝛼?̃?𝑖
𝛿𝑖
𝑡−𝑡𝑖+1
 becomes non-zero if 𝛿𝑖 ≠ 0, and so it serves as an updated origin 
from which the difference on the left hand side of (1) starts to converge anew. 
In theory, as time increases towards infinity, the updated origin receives less and less weight 
(and the initial origin even less), so the difference between the equilibrium of the model and 
the data converges to the asymptote 𝛾. Thus, if the estimate of 𝛾 is not significantly different 
from zero, we conclude that the data series converges to the equilibrium prediction. 
Since we have two calls per period, it is not immediately clear how to define 𝑝𝑖𝑡 and 𝑝𝑖𝑡
∗ , 
because the model does not predict the dynamics within a period. We explicitly address this in 
Subsection 3.4, where we describe the application of the Newton method to our data. For our 
convergence results, we defined the observed market price in a period, 𝑝𝑖𝑡, as the average 
realized price across two calls, and the equilibrium market price in a period, 𝑝𝑖𝑡
∗ , as the 
competitive equilibrium price, based on the private values and costs of buyers and sellers who 
were actively present15 in at least one of the two calls in the period. Since there was no carry-
over cost from call to call, the model predicts that the two calls should create the same price 
and that the total volume should be distributed to maintain the equal prices. The theoretical 
equilibrium price as well as volume could change in every period, depending on the number of 
traders who are present. Thus, we defined the actual volume in a period as the total number 
of units traded at both calls, and the equilibrium trading volume as the volume that 
corresponds to the equilibrium price, 𝑝𝑖𝑡
∗ . 
                                                          
15
 By “actively present” we mean those participants who submit public orders before a call, i.e., reveal their wish 
to participate in trade.  This defines the model to include  the number and identity of traders that were in the 
market.  Note that it may happen that their orders do not trade at the call, but such orders form a part of the 
market supply and demand at a given call, and hence are taken into account. In experiments conducted with 
remotely located subjects, as opposed to all subjects confined to the laboratory, a degree of experimental 
control is lost. Subjects can become distracted or simply quit without warning. From one point of view, this 
phenomenon is a lack of control, but a bid or ask reveals presence and parameters can be adjusted accordingly, 
so from another point of view the appearance or disappearance of subjects illustrates the robustness of a model 
that works. 
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3.2 Market Efficiency 
As a measure of efficiency in each period, we used the consumer plus producer surplus 
expressed as a percentage of the maximum possible (Plott and Smith, 1978). We define it as 
the difference between the total “consumption”, i.e., the franc redemption value of the 
purchased units, and the total franc cost of those units, divided by the maximum possible 
difference between total of redemption values and costs that can be achieved during a 
period. The maximum is achieved at the competitive equilibrium allocation, which, if attained, 
is 100% efficient.  
Let 𝑅 =  {𝑟} be the set of all redemption values to all buyers that participated in one or more 
of the two calls in period 𝑡. Let 𝐶 = {𝑐} be the set of all costs to all sellers that participated in 
one or more of the two calls in period 𝑡. Order the elements of 𝑅 from highest to lowest, with 
𝑟𝑖 being the 𝑖-th element. Order the elements of 𝐶 from lowest to highest, with 𝑐𝑖 being 
the 𝑖-th element. Let 𝑅∗ and 𝐶∗ denote the sets of redemptions and costs that were actually 
exercised during the period. Maximum Surplus is 
𝑀𝑆 = max
𝑧
∑(𝑟𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖)
𝑧
𝑖=1
 
Realized Surplus is 
𝑅𝑆 = ∑ 𝑟
𝑟∈𝑅∗ 
− ∑ 𝑐
𝑐∈𝐶∗ 
 
We define efficiency in period 𝑡 as the ratio of the two quantities: 
Efficiency =
Realized surplus
Maximum surplus
   (2) 
Notice that subjects can submit multiple-unit orders, and we explicitly account for this 
possibility in the efficiency score. 
3.3 Market Jaws 
The structure of the data in the order book is sometimes described as an open mouth with an 
upper jaw and a lower jaw, together with a tongue, which is a curve tracing the average of the 
two. Market jaws provide a snapshot of commitments by potential traders that approximate 
important features of observed market adjustments in continuous markets. Here, the model is 
adapted for call markets institutions. When a call takes place, these commitments together 
with market making rules define exchanges that are executed at the call. The connection of 
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market jaws to Newton's method for continuous markets is developed in Bossaerts and Plott 
(2008).  
The basic intuition is as follows. As order flow develops and bids and asks are submitted, the 
shape of the order book changes in a self-organizing and specific way that reflects aggregate 
demand and supply. In order to become “provisional traders” who would trade if a call took 
place, traders can revise their bids and asks in an attempt to meet or beat the competition in 
light of the offers tendered by the other side of the market. The tendency of bidders to 
anticipate the bids of others is an established property of call markets (Cason and Friedman, 
1997; Kagel 2004).  The fact that traders have multiple units limits the incentive for value 
revelation due to the capacity of marginal units to move the market price. For the marginal 
and extra marginal units outside the expected set of provisional trades, the possibility that 
price changes randomly creates an incentive for value revelation. Value revelation is 
encouraged by the possibility to trade in the case the market “jumps” from expected price. 
As a result, the order book is continuously updated as traders update their orders in light of 
the orders of others. The orders of those traders whose true values are extra marginal at the 
current price are pushed out. Bidders change their offers with increasing revelation of the 
marginal values in response. The shape of the book resembles jaws, hence the name. 
To illustrate, consider Figure 2 in which everything is evaluated at the first call; 𝑝1 is the actual 
price; 𝑞1 is the actual total volume; 𝑎𝜏 is the 𝜏-th ask in the order book, which is used for slope 
estimation; 𝑎0 is the first unfilled ask in the book; 𝑏𝜏 is the 𝜏-th bid in the book; 𝑏0 is the first 
unfilled bid in the book; 𝑝2 = 𝑝1 + Δ 𝑝 is the price at the second call; and  ?̃?2 = 𝑞2 + 𝑞1 is the 
corresponding quantity. The true demand and supply curves (based on the private values and 
costs of the traders present at both calls) are given by 𝐷 and 𝑆, respectively. For the sake of 
clarity, they are drawn as continuous curves, but in the actual experiment 𝐷 and 𝑆 are 
discrete step-wise curves, just like the corresponding actual data. 
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Figure 2. Theory behind the jaws, applied after the first call. 
The step-wise curves represent the orders placed before the first call as seen in the actual 
data. Denote ?̂?1 and ?̂?1 the remaining revealed demand/supply at price 𝑝1, estimated from 
the actual data. Let 𝛼 denote the angle between ?̂?1 and 𝑝1, and 𝛽 denote the angle between 
𝑝1 and ?̂?1. The market level, induced (true) demand/supply curves have the corresponding 
angles at price 𝑝1 being 𝛼
∗ and 𝛽∗, respectively (see Figure 2). The market jaws, revealed at 
price 𝑝1, correspond to the slopes of ?̂?1 and ?̂?1. 
The jaws model of the order book dynamics postulates two important properties in the call 
market environment reflecting the following theoretical intuitions. 
First, slope revelation: the excluded traders' orders accumulate according to the ranking of 
their true values and costs, and therefore the book at the call reflects the true slopes of 
aggregate demand and supply at the call price. Thus the first property says: both revealed 
jaws closely approximate the slopes of the true demand and supply at price 𝑝1, i.e., 𝛼 ≈ 𝛼
∗ 
and 𝛽 ≈ 𝛽∗. 
Second, excess demand revelation: the arrival rates of bids and asks shortly before a call 
approximate excess demand at the call price. The theoretical intuition behind the second 
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property is that an approaching call motivates the traders to actively submit and adjust their 
bids and asks.  The rate of buy orders and sell orders depends, respectively on the number of 
buyers and sellers, and thus the excess demand at the current price. 
As we show below, these properties are crucial for applying the Newton method of solving 
systems of equations to the price dynamics across calls. These properties also rely on the 
more fundamental feature of Marshallian adjustment path. For the slopes to be equal to 
those of the excess demand the proper units must be included as a part of the trade.  The 
Marshallian path is an empirical property that buyers with high values and sellers with low 
costs are those that first find their way to trade. This is the mysterious property predicted by 
the Wilson model, observed as part of BNE performance by Cason and Friedman (1997), and 
Kagel (2004), and documented as a feature of the continuous double auction by Plott, Roy, 
and Tang (2013). 
3.4 Newton and Walrasian Adjustment 
A Newton-type price dynamics means that the market price at time 𝑡 + 1 depends on the 
market price at time 𝑡 in a specific way: the price difference is proportional to the remaining 
excess demand with the coefficient being the inverse of the excess demand derivative. Thus 
the Newton process depends on both the excess demand and the slope of the excess demand. 
Formally, 
𝑝𝑡+1 − 𝑝𝑡 = −
𝐷(𝑝𝑡)−𝑆(𝑝𝑡)
𝐷′(𝑝𝑡)−𝑆′(𝑝𝑡)
 (3) 
where 𝑝𝑡 is the market price at time 𝑡, 𝐷 and 𝑆 denote the true demand and supply curves, 
and 𝐷′(⋅) and 𝑆′(⋅) are their respective derivatives. In our experiment, 𝑡 is either 1 or 2 (i.e., 
the first or the second call), but we can also use the equilibrium price 𝑝∗ instead of 𝑝𝑡+1 in (3). 
Notice that if the price dynamics followed Newton and we knew the excess demand and its 
derivative at time 𝑡, then we could use the price at time 𝑡 and (3) to predict price at time 𝑡 +
1. 
A natural alternative to the Newton dynamics is Walrasian adjustment, where 
𝑝𝑡+1 − 𝑝𝑡 = 𝐴[𝐷(𝑝𝑡) − 𝑆(𝑝𝑡)]  (4) 
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Thus, the difference of Walrasian adjustment from Newton is that the former does not 
utilize the slopes of excess demand, assuming that the price change is proportional to the 
excess demand with some positive constant factor 𝐴. 
In some continuous time environments, in particular, in unstable environments16, where 
prices do not converge to the competitive equilibrium, Walrasian adjustment finds more 
support than Newton (Hirota et al, 2005). Assured global convergence to the competitive 
equilibrium via an iterative procedure in general environments cannot be guaranteed (Saari, 
1985). However, the information about excess demand and its slope suffices for local 
convergence (Saari and Simon, 1978), and is particularly relevant in our environment with 
quasi-linear supply and demand, and no income effects. 
The information about the excess demand and its slope can be related to the market jaws. 
This relationship is based on two hypothesized properties of the jaws we described in 
Subsection 3.3. First, (slope revelation:) the revealed jaws will closely approximate the 
slopes of the true demand and supply at price 𝑝1, i.e., in terms of Figure 2, 𝛼 ≈ 𝛼
∗ and 
𝛽 ≈ 𝛽∗. Second, (excess demand revelation:) the pattern of jaws changing shortly before 
the call will reflect excess demand at price 𝑝1, the second key property of the dynamic 
model, via the relative arrival rate of bids and asks. 
If the two properties of the jaws hold, the price dynamics across calls follows Newton if and 
only if 
(𝑝𝑡+1 − 𝑝𝑡)(cot 𝛼 + cot 𝛽 ) = 𝐷(𝑝𝑡) − 𝑆(𝑝𝑡) 
This follows from the fact that if 𝛼 = 𝛼∗ and 𝛽 = 𝛽∗, 
𝑆′(𝑝𝑡) = tan (
𝜋
2
− 𝛼∗) = cot 𝛼∗ 
𝐷′(𝑝𝑡) = tan (
𝜋
2
+ 𝛽∗) = − cot 𝛽∗ 
The relationships summarize the main property of Newton-Jaws. 
4 Results 
In this section we present several types of results describing the market level properties 
(macro-properties) of the call markets (convergence, efficiency, and price dynamics). 
Subsection 4.1 addresses the traditional measures of market performance such as 
convergence of prices, volumes and efficiency relative to the competitive equilibrium. 
Subsection 4.2 addresses the more detailed model of the nature of price adjustment as 
                                                          
16
 See Scarf(1960). 
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suggested by the Newton dynamic. Subsection 4.3 addresses aspects of individual behavior 
and related empirical properties of the call markets. Subsection 4.4 provides a robustness 
check using zero-intelligence traders. 
4.1 Market Performance Relative to the Competitive Equilibrium 
The section contains three results related to broad properties of the call markets. Together 
the results say that market behavior is captured by the competitive equilibrium model. Prices, 
volumes, and efficiencies all converge to near the quantities predicted by the model. Price and 
volume behave substantially as predicted when parameters change. These are evident in 
Figures 3, 4, and 5 showing respectively, price convergence, volume convergence, and 
efficiencies in response to a market with a stationary demand and supply punctuated by a 
parameter shift in period 9, and then returning to a stationary level. 
Result 1. In the two-call multiple-unit market, price and trading volume converge to near the 
equilibrium levels of the competitive equilibrium model. Equilibrium price upward shift affects 
price but not volume convergence, as predicted. 
Support. Using data from 7 market experiments, we estimate a simple dynamic model of 
convergence we described in Subsection 3.1 for price (and volume): 
𝑝𝑖𝑡 − 𝑝𝑖𝑡
∗ = (
𝛼?̃?1𝛿1
𝑡 − 𝑡1 + 1
+
𝛽1
𝑡
) 𝑑1 + ⋯ + (
𝛼?̃?𝑖𝛿𝑖
𝑡 − 𝑡𝑖 + 1
+
𝛽𝑖
𝑡
) 𝑑𝑖 + ⋯ 
+ (
𝛼?̃?𝐾
𝛿𝐾
𝑡−𝑡𝐾+1
+
𝛽𝐾
𝑡
) 𝑑𝐾 + 𝛾 (1 −
1
𝑡
) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡        (5) 
We estimate the model in (5) using ordinary least squares with bootstrapped standard errors. 
Since we have the order book cleared across the periods, we can treat periods as independent 
observations.17  An estimate of the common asymptote, 𝛾, close to zero implies that the 
actual price/volume converges to the price/volume of the static theoretical model as time 
proceeds. The results of our estimation are reported in Table 3. 
 
 
                                                          
17
 Allowing for autocorrelation does not noticeably change the results. 
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Table 3: Estimation of Convergence: Price and Quantity 
Regressor Dependent Variable: 
 Price difference, 𝑝𝑖𝑡 − 𝑝𝑖𝑡
∗  Volume difference, 𝑞𝑖𝑡 − 𝑞𝑖𝑡
∗  
Asymptote (𝛾) 7.712 (2.488) -1.784** (0.458) 
Origin (before shift) in     
Session 1 (β1) -17.254 (26.230) -1.942 (5.175) 
--2(β2)  -2.756 (11.499) -1.551 (1.645) 
--3(β3) -22.863* (12.178) -10.549 (4.485) 
--4(β4) -18.408 (12.628) -5.842 (4.113) 
--5(β5) -64.464*** (12.744) -1.467 (2.456) 
--6(β6) -64.622 (23.393) -8.634 (3.299) 
--7(β7) -22.799 (28.315) -3.924* (2.511) 
Origin (after shift) in     
Session 1 (δ1) -42. 811* (13.608) -2.492 (2.464) 
--2(δ 2) -53.257*** (8.223) -5.607 (3.077) 
--3(δ 3) 1.485 (8.682) 3.724*** (1.612) 
--4(δ 4) -10.275 (10.932) 1.503 (2.883) 
--5(δ 5) -51.465*** (11.496) -1.253 (3.457) 
--6(δ 6) -67.097*** (14.909) -1.425 (3.870) 
--7(δ 7) -38.136* (14.729) -0.756 (1.400) 
N 94 94 
𝑅𝑎𝑑𝑗
2  0.732 0.638 
F-stat 20.88 13.82 
Notes.  Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses.  Estimates are bootstrap-corrected for bias.  
Significance codes: ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05 
 
As Table 3 shows, we cannot reject price convergence: the estimated value of the asymptote 
𝛾, 7.712, is not significantly different from zero, with its bootstrap standard error of 2.488. At 
the same time, we reject volume convergence, as the respective estimate of the asymptote in 
this case is -1.784 with its bootstrap standard error of 0.458. Nevertheless, the estimated 
differences are rather small: the equilibrium price in these experiments ranged from 165 to 
280.5 francs (against the error of 7.638 francs), and the equilibrium volume ranged from 17 to 
32 units (against the error of 1.778 units). Thus we argue that the price, and to a lesser extent, 
volume, converge close to their equilibrium levels. 
Notice also that the parameter shift effects are consistent with model predictions. In our 
experiments, the shift increases the equilibrium price by a constant, but does not change the 
equilibrium volume. The estimations in Table 3 display this feature: the updated origins after 
the shift, 𝛿1-𝛿7 (except 𝛿3 and 𝛿4), are highly significant and large for the price convergence 
equation, whereas for the volume convergence, only 𝛿3 is significant. 
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Figures 3-4 show graphically the price and volume dynamics across periods, averaged over all 
experiments. The spike at period 9 corresponds to the shift in parameters. Figure 3 also shows 
that for almost all periods, price at the second call is closer to equilibrium than price at the 
first one. 
 
Figure 3: Average price dynamics across periods. 
 
Figure 4: Average volume dynamics across periods. 
∎ 
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Result 2. The average efficiency score increases over time as price and volume converge to 
their equilibrium levels. The two-call market does not achieve full efficiency, but is about 83 
percent efficient on average. 
Support. We computed efficiency in each period of all experiments as the normalized total 
surplus, defined in Subsection 3.2 as follows. 
Efficiency =
Realized surplus
Maximum surplus
 
The average efficiency score is 82.54%. This is a bit less than levels typically reported in single- 
call market experiments (e.g., Cason and Friedman (1997) report an efficiency score of 87.3%). 
However, the average efficiency score increases over time, as price and volume converge to 
their equilibrium levels, with a sharp drop after the parameter shift, which corresponds to the 
market adjustment. Figure 5 illustrates. 
 
Figure 5:  Average efficiency score by period (average across periods: 82.6%, converges to 
89.1%). 
It seems intuitive that the efficiency score should roughly correspond to how well the total 
volume in a period matches the equilibrium volume, provided the actual price is close to the 
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equilibrium price.18 However, there is more to this than a simple comparison of total volumes: 
since subjects can make multiple-unit orders, it is also matters that all subjects exhibit good 
inventory management and do not over- or under-acquire their inventory. ∎ 
Result 3. The parameter shift of demand and supply upward by a constant only affects the 
price, and not the volume of trading, as should be expected. There is no significant effect on 
the observed efficiency. 
Support. Table 4 presents the summary statistics of the data across periods, grouped by the 
parameter shift. As expected, the period volume before and after the parameter shift does 
not change much, since the shift only affected price, and not volume. The changes in 
equilibrium volume are due to the varying number of traders. The changes in efficiency are 
not significantly different (Mann-Whitney p=0.172). ∎ 
Table 4:  Summary data statistics across periods 
 
Variable Before shift After Shift 
 Mean Range Mean   Range 
Total period volume, units 21.38 [13.00 .. 32,00] 20.43 [13.0 .. 29.00] 
Equilibrium period volume, units 23.93 [17.00 .. 32.00] 23.00 [18.00 .. 32.00] 
Average period price, francs 174.50 [121.50 .. 225.00] 248.30 [191.50 .. 288.50] 
Equilibrium period price, francs 179.60 [165.00 .. 201.00] 256.70 [240.00 .. 280.50] 
Efficiency, % 79.81 [28.28 .. 99.54] 85.32 [61.80 .. 99.21] 
 
4.2 Principles and Models of Price Discovery: Newton-Jaws and Alternatives 
In this subsection we demonstrate that key elements of market jaws and the Newton method, 
characterized in Subsections 3.3 and 3.4, are observed in the call markets. We organize the 
Results into two parts, focusing first on structural and specification tests (i.e., how well the 
models explain the data conditioned on known parameters) and next on parameter sensitivity 
and prediction properties (i.e., relative model performance conditioned on estimated 
parameters). 
4.2.1 Structural approach  
                                                          
18
 When the actual price is far from the equilibrium price, efficiency is low even if the volumes are matched 
exactly. This is the case, for example in the first period after practice in the experiment of Session 5 in Table 1: 
the equilibrium price was 188, the actual price was 117; subjects acquired 26 units (with 28 units in equilibrium) 
and the efficiency score was the lowest: 28.28%. 
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The next three results address three different models that ultimately become combined into 
the Newton-Jaws model.  Each has its own structure that can be tested separately.  Result 4 
addresses the market jaws model. Result 5 examines the Newton model and Result 6 
examines the Walrasian model. 
Result 4. Properties of order flow organized as market jaws reveal excess demand slope and 
excess demand magnitude. (i) (Slope revelation). The estimates of revealed demand/supply 
slopes at call 1 and 2 obtained from the jaws are consistent with the excess demand slopes 
based on true parameters of the model. (ii) (Excess demand revelation). The jaws-based 
estimates of the excess demand approach the actual excess demand, especially at call 2. At 
call 1, substantial variance precludes tight convergence. 
Support. Consider (i), slope revelation. The jaws imperfectly but robustly reflect the true 
slopes of aggregate demand and supply at each call. In terms of Figure 2, the null hypothesis 
says: both revealed jaws closely approximate the slopes of the true demand and supply at 
price 𝑝1, i.e. 𝛼 ≈ 𝛼
∗ and 𝛽 ≈ 𝛽∗. To test that this holds for demand and supply remaining 
after the first call, we use the following algorithm, which has a resemblance to the two-stage 
least squares, and essentially compares 𝑆′(𝑝1) with cot 𝛼 (or 𝐷
′(𝑝1) with − cot 𝛽, 
respectively). For brevity, the description here focuses on supply only. Stage l and ll address 
measurement challenges created by the discrete nature of the data. Stage lll tests whether 
the measured slopes reveal the true ones. 
Stage I. For each data point 𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝑁} corresponding to the first call in a period (subindex 𝑖 
is suppressed below): 
1) Estimate the slope of the revealed supply at 𝑝1,  ?̂?1, by best fitting 𝜏 + 1 remaining 
(i.e., untraded) asks in the book with a line that goes through the actual price-quantity 
point at the first call, (𝑝1, 𝑞1). That is, estimate a regression of the form 
𝑢𝑘 − 𝑞1 = 𝜃(𝑎𝑘 − 𝑝1) 
where 𝑎𝑘 > 𝑝1 is the 𝑘-th remaining ask in the book, 𝑘 ∈ {0, … , 𝜏}, 𝑢𝑘 is the 
corresponding 𝑘-th unit, and 𝜃 = cot ?̂?is the estimate of the slope of ?̂?1. Keep 𝜃. 
2) Estimate the slope of the true supply at 𝑝1, 𝑆(𝑝1), by best fitting 2𝜏
′ private costs 
around the true supply curve at 𝑝1 (i.e., those 𝑐𝑘 ∈ [𝑝1 − Δ, 𝑝1 + Δ] for some Δ > 0 
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and each 𝑘 ∈ {−𝜏′, … ,0, … , 𝜏′}) with a line that goes through supply at the actual price 
at the first call, (𝑝1, 𝑆(𝑝1)). That is, estimate a regression of the form 
𝑢𝑘 − 𝑆(𝑝1) = 𝜃
∗(𝑐𝑘 − 𝑝1) 
where 𝑐𝑘 is the k-th component in the vector (𝑐−𝜏′ , … , 𝑐0, … , 𝑐𝜏′) of costs for a fixed 𝜏
′ 
around the true supply19 at 𝑝1, with𝑐−𝜏′ ≤ ⋯ ≤ 𝑐0 ≤ ⋯ ≤ 𝑐𝜏′; 𝑢𝑘 is the corresponding 
𝑘-th unit around 𝑆(𝑝1), and 𝜃
∗ = cot?̂?∗is the estimate of the slope of 𝑆′(𝑝1). Keep 𝜃
∗. 
3) Record the pair (cot ?̂?𝑖, cot ?̂?𝑖
∗) as one observation in the new dataset. 
Stage II.  Using the data constructed at stage I, estimate 
cot ?̂?𝑖 = 𝛾1 cot ?̂?𝑖
∗ + 𝜀𝑖  (6) 
where 𝜀𝑖 is the random error. We bootstrapped the regression in (6) using 10,000 replications. 
Stage III. Test the null hypothesis 𝐻0:  𝛾1 = 1 versus the two-sided alternative. If the null is 
not rejected, then the slope of the remaining supply after the first call perfectly reveals the 
true supply slope. Alternatively, we can add an intercept 𝛾0 in (6) and test the joint null 
𝐻0: 𝛾0 = 0 & 𝛾1 = 1.
20 If the null is rejected but 𝛾1is positive and significant, the slope is 
revealed imperfectly, still providing some useful information about the underlying market 
parameters.  
The coherence of true supply and revealed supply slopes after the second call, as well as 
coherence of true demand and revealed demand after each call, can be estimated and tested 
in the same way. 
The procedure above is silent about how 𝜏 and 𝜏′ are specified. For 𝜏′ this is not an issue, 
since the equilibrium demand/supply at any price is recovered from our parameters, and is 
close to a linear curve in all of our experimental sessions. To have a sufficiently smooth 
approximation, we chose 𝜏′ = 7, thus estimating the equilibrium slopes on 14 points around 
the point where the equilibrium curve intersects with the actual price. 
To determine 𝜏, we used two approaches. In the first one, we exogenously fixed 𝜏 at ¾ of 
excluded orders for each data point 𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝑁}. This helps exclude the extreme orders that 
                                                          
19
 For example, if we take three true costs below 𝑝1 and three true costs above 𝑝1, then 𝜏
′ = 3. 
20
 We checked both specifications and found minimal differences.  
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may have large impact on linear estimates. In the second one, we repeated steps 1)-2) of 
stage I above, varying 𝜏 from 3 units21 up to the length of the book (in units) at the call in 
question, and then picked the value that produced the best match (in terms of minimizing the 
absolute difference) between the slopes of equilibrium demand/supply and the slopes of the 
actual data at that price, estimated using 𝜏 units of remaining demand/supply. Thus, in this 
case we best-fitted the slopes for individual data points of the regression at stage II. Note that 
this does not automatically imply that regression (6) is trivial, since different data points may 
require different values of 𝜏. This approach nests the jaws estimation technique from 
Asparouhova, Bossaerts, and Plott (2003), who find limited support for the Newton method 
using a small and exogenously set 𝜏. 
We can now proceed to stage II using 𝜏 and 𝜏′ defined above, and test if the jaws accurately 
reflect the slopes. We report the more conservative estimates (with fixed 𝜏) in Table 5, and 
additional estimates in Table 12 in Appendix A. 
Table 5: Estimation of supply/demand slope revelation at each call by market jaws 
 
 Supply at call 1 Demand at call 1 Supply at call 2 Demand at Call 2 
Regressor Estimate (SE) Estimate (SE) Estimate (SE) Estimate (SE) 
Slope (γ1) 0.693*** (0.064) 1.524*** (0.204) 0.661*** (0.046) 1.007*** (0.104) 
H0: γ1 = 1 Rejected*** Rejected* Rejected*** Not Rejected 
Notes. Each column contains bootstrap-corrected estimates of regression (6) terms (for jaws computed using fixed 
τ) and their standard errors using 10,000 replications. We also report a bootstrap-test of the null of perfect 
revelation by jaws, H0: γ1 = 1. Significance codes: ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05 
After the first call, the slope of the revealed supply can be positively related to the slope of 
the equilibrium supply, but the null of full supply revelation is rejected at <0.1% significance 
level. By contrast, the true demand revelation at call 1 is only marginally rejected. We also 
checked revelation after the second call. The null hypothesis of perfect revelation by jaws for 
demand is not rejected. Demand is revealed better than supply at the second call. 
Overall, our results in Table 5 show that jaws can be imperfectly but meaningfully related to 
the slope of the excess demand even with substantially infrequent trade opportunities, as in a 
call market. 
                                                          
21
 We chose 3 as the minimal number of units that allows a non-singular OLS fit. 
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Consider ii), excess demand revelation. The second hypothesized property of jaw adjustment 
is that arrivals of bids and asks shortly before a call approximate excess demand at the call 
price. The intuition is that an approaching call motivates the traders to actively submit and 
adjust their bids and asks, with adjustment rate depending on excess demand at the current 
price. 
We test this hypothesis by estimating a model of convergence of the excess demand 
estimated using bid-ask arrival rates to the actual excess demand at the call price. An arrival 
rate is computed as the number of respective items (bids or asks) in the book over a time 
period. We used a discretization step of 5 seconds. The excess demand is then estimated as a 
sum of the bid-ask arrival differences over the last 30 seconds before each call.22 
We use the difference between (bid-ask based) excess demand and the actual excess demand 
at the call as a dependent variable in regression (5) that was previously used to estimate 
convergence to equilibrium price and volume. The resulting table is similar to Table 3 (see 
Table 13 in Appendix A). The null of perfect convergence is rejected at call 1, since the 
estimate of the asymptote coefficient in regression (5) applied to the difference between the 
bid-ask arrival excess demand and the actual excess demand at call 1 is 7.553, significantly 
different from zero. However, we cannot reject convergence at call 2: the asymptote of 3.892 
is insignificant. Figure 6 illustrates that revelation of excess demand via bid-ask arrival rates 
improve over time approaching the actual excess demand, while substantial variance in 
estimated excess demand at call 1 precludes tight convergence.23 
                                                          
22
 We chose this time interval to capture the most intense period of trading activity shortly before a call. 
23
 Spearman rank correlation between excess demand and bid-ask arrival rates is 0.141 at call 1, and 0.139 at call 
2.  
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(a) Call 1            (b) Call 2 
Figure 6: Average difference between excess demand as revealed by jaws and the 
actual excess demand after each call. In period 9 there is a parameter shift. ∎ 
Result 5. The price dynamics within a period is related to the analytical structure of the 
Newton method of solving systems of equations. The relation is significant and particularly 
strong for predicting the equilibrium price given the actual induced parameters, excess 
demand and excess demand slope evaluated at the call price. 
Support. The theory behind this result is described in Subsection 3.4. There are several ways 
to estimate Newton (3). The simplest one is to use the actual excess demand and slope as 
dictated by parameters and the independent variables and directly estimate a linear relation 
𝑝𝑡+1 − 𝑝𝑡 = 𝛿1
𝐸𝐷(𝑝𝑡)
𝐸𝐷′(𝑝𝑡)
+ 𝜀 (7) 
where 𝑡 = 1, 2 is the call number, 𝐸𝐷(𝑝𝑡) is excess demand at price 𝑝𝑡, 𝐸𝐷
′(𝑝𝑡) is the slope 
of excess demand at 𝑝𝑡, and 𝜀 is the random error, and then test if 𝛿1 = −1.Alternatively, 
one can add the intercept:  
𝑝𝑡+1 − 𝑝𝑡 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1
𝐸𝐷(𝑝𝑡)
𝐸𝐷′(𝑝𝑡)
+ 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀 (8) 
and test the joint hypothesis H0: δ0 = 0, δ1 = -1.  
There are also at least three choices for the time difference in (7) and (8). For 𝑡 = 1, we have 
a choice between setting 𝑝𝑡+1 equal to the price at the second call and the equilibrium price. 
For 𝑡 = 2, we set 𝑝𝑡+1 to be the equilibrium price in the current period, since books are 
cleared each period. 
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Table 6 presents the main estimation results for the Newton regression (7) using the actual 
excess demand and its slope.  
Table 6: Estimation of Newton at each call using actual excess demand and its slope 
 
 Call 1 Call 2 
Regressor Dep. Var.: 𝑝∗ − 𝑝1 Dep. Var.: 𝑝2 − 𝑝1 Dep. Var.: 𝑝∗ − 𝑝2 
Newton part (δ1) -0.991** -0.441*** -1.070*** 
 (0.090) (0.038) (0.049) 
N 108 108 108 
𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸 6.142 5.904 3.171 
Newton hypothesis Not Rejected Rejected*** Not Rejected 
Notes.  Bootstrap-corrected estimates of regression (7) terms (using 10,000 replications) with their 
standard errors in parentheses.  The hypothesis H0: δ1 = -1 is bootstrap-tested. Significance codes: 
***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05  
 
The main insight from Table 6 is that there is a significant relation between the Newton term 
and the price dynamics. More specifically, when regression (7) is estimated for the difference 
between the equilibrium price and the price at either call, the null hypothesis of perfect 
Newton dynamics is not rejected. When we estimate (7) for the difference between the call 
prices, the null of perfect Newton is rejected, indicating that the price change across calls is 
too large to approximate the instantaneous rate of change sufficiently well as required by 
Newton. 
Thus, there is a strong evidence for a Newton structure. The price movement is to the 
equilibrium but not to the next call price (unless it is near the equilibrium), which emphasizes 
that the Newton method is a theory of equilibration, not a theory of price movement 
independent of its equilibration tendencies. In particular, the price change across calls in a 
period seems to incorporate factors in addition to the Newton term, like, e.g., strategic 
considerations. ∎ 
Result 6. Walrasian model based on excess demand given by parameters at the call price also 
explains price change in a period but less accurately than Newton.  
Support. The simplest way to estimate Walrasian adjustment (4) is to directly estimate a 
linear relation using the theoretical excess demand as dictated by parameters as the 
independent variable 
𝑝𝑡+1 − 𝑝𝑡 = 𝛾1𝐸𝐷(𝑝𝑡) + 𝜀 (9) 
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and then test 𝐻0: 𝛾1 ≥ 0 vs. one-sided alternative 𝛾1 < 0. Thus, the fundamental difference 
from Newton adjustment is that (9) does not utilize the excess demand slope. 
Table 7 shows the results of the model estimation. 
Table 7: Estimation of Walras at each call using actual excess demand and its slope 
 
 Call 1 Call 2 
Regressor Dep. Var.: 𝑝∗ − 𝑝1 Dep. Var.: 𝑝2 − 𝑝1 Dep. Var.: 𝑝∗ − 𝑝2 
Walras part (γ1) 1.474*** 0.557*** 1.562** 
 (0.085) (0.107) (0.068) 
N 108 108 108 
𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸 5.162 7.205 3.550 
Walras hypothesis Not Rejected Not Rejected Not Rejected 
Notes.  Bootstrap-corrected estimates of regression (9) terms (using 10,000 replications) with their 
standard errors in parentheses.  The null hypothesis 𝐻0: 𝛾1 ≥ 0 vs. alternative 𝐻𝑎: 𝛾1 < 0 is 
bootstrap-tested. Significance codes: ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05  
 
While we observe a significant and positive coefficient on the excess demand, 𝛾1, as predicted 
by Walras, the overall regression fit is worse than that produced by Newton (7) in Table 6 in 
two out of three cases, estimated from the same data, as indicated by a higher value of root-
mean-square error (RMSE). The exception is the estimate of call 1 price in which the RMSE is 
5.162 for Walras and 6.142 for the Newton model. Thus Newton seems to outperform Walras 
adjustment by utilizing the information about the slopes of excess demand in price 
adjustment between calls and after the second call. ∎ 
4.2.2 Parameter information sensitivity and relative model performance 
When the structure of the Newton method of solving systems of equations is supplemented 
by the behavioral features of Jaws a new, Newton-Jaws, model takes shape. The Newton-
Jaws model merges two variables known to be associated with price discovery, excess 
demand and order flow. Results 4 and 5 together with the models from Subsections 3.3 and 
3.4 demonstrated that these variables both can stand alone and provide the ingredients for 
useful models of market movement. Each provides its own view of market adjustment. 
However, a more powerful model emerges when the two types of variables become 
integrated into the Newton-Jaws model. Result 4 and Result 5, together with (7) outline a 
precise way this can be done.24  
                                                          
24
 Namely, Result 5 shows support for the Newton method of price adjustment across calls when the right hand 
side of equation (7) is evaluated conditioned on known experimental parameters. Jaws provide a way to recover 
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This seems particularly relevant for settings where the underlying supply and demand 
parameters are not observed by the econometrician, e.g., in the field. In the analysis that 
follows, we investigate the relative performance of Newton-Jaws and its sensitivity to the 
information about parameters. The model makes very precise predictions about the price 
change, and so should be easy to reject in the data. Nevertheless, Result 7 below 
demonstrates that Newton-Jaws is on par with less precise adjustment models, like Walras 
and excess bids, that only make predictions about the sign of the price change.  
Result 7. For predicting price change in a period the Newton-Jaws model fit is similar to that 
of Walrasian and excess bids, and uniformly better when estimated conditioned on known 
excess demand and jaws-estimated excess demand slope. 
Support. The excess bids model is examined through the application of the same 
methodology as used to test the Newton-Jaws model and the Walrasian excess demand 
model.  Let 𝑋𝐵(𝑝𝑡) be the total number of buy orders (bids) minus the total number of sell 
orders (asks) existing in the market at time t. With t being the end of second call, we should 
note that the excess bid measure includes all bids and asks at the call, including those 
untraded orders that remained from the first call. We estimate 
𝑝
𝑡+1
− 𝑝
𝑡
= 𝛽
1
𝑋𝐵(𝑝
𝑡
) + 𝜀 (10) 
Table 8 shows the results of the model estimation. 
Table 8: Estimation of price dynamics using excess bids 
 
 Call 1 Call 2 
Regressor Dep. Var.: 𝑝∗ − 𝑝1 Dep. Var.: 𝑝2 − 𝑝1 Dep. Var.: 𝑝∗ − 𝑝2 
Excess bid part (𝛽1) 1.414*** 0.577*** 0.615*** 
 (0.332) (0.144) (0.243) 
N 108 108 108 
𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸 19.368 10.042 13.954 
Excess bid hypothesis Not Rejected Not Rejected Not Rejected 
Notes. Bootstrap-corrected estimates of regression (10) terms (using 10,000 replications) 
with their standard errors in parentheses. The null hypothesis 𝐻0: 𝛽1 ≥ 0 vs. alternative 
𝐻𝑎: 𝛽1 < 0 is bootstrap-tested. Significance codes: ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05  
                                                                                                                                                                                        
the Newton part in (7) directly from the data, as we established in Result 4, and allow us to estimate these 
quantities in various combinations. First, we can take both slopes and excess demand estimated from the jaws. 
Second, we can take the jaws-estimated slopes and use the true excess demand. Third, we can take the true 
slopes and use the jaws-estimated excess demand. Finally, for jaws-based slope estimates, we can use either the 
fixed revealed jaws, or the best-fitted revealed jaws. All of these cases are reported in Tables 13 and 14 in 
Appendix A, which include Table 6 as a special case. 
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The results in Table 8 demonstrate that the model of price dynamics based on the number of 
buy orders (bids) minus the number of sell orders (asks) cannot be rejected.   
Both Walras and Newton show a better overall fit than excess bids when evaluated using the 
true parameters, as indicated by uniformly lower RMSE in Tables 6 and 7 compared to Table 8. 
Since excess bids do not rely on experiment parameters, it is important to check whether the 
better fit of Walras and Newton continues to hold when the true parameters are unknown, as 
in the field. Therefore, we also compared the fit when these models are evaluated 
conditioned on estimated measures of excess demand and its slope, so that all three models 
are on an equal footing. This comparison is reported below (see Tables 14 and 16 in Appendix 
A for additional details).  
Table 9: Fit of Newton-Jaws, Walras, and Excess bids using empirical measures of excess 
demand (ED) and its slope 
 
 Call 1 Call 2 
Model Dep. Var.: 𝑝∗ − 𝑝1 Dep. Var.: 𝑝2 − 𝑝1 Dep. Var.: 𝑝∗ − 𝑝2 
Excess bids 
Walras 
Newton-Jaws 
   EDjaws, ED slopejaws 
   EDjaws, true ED slope  
    true ED, ED slopejaws 
 
19.638 
21.260 
 
20.670 
21.121 
11.877 
10.042 
10.529 
 
10.493 
10.468 
7.919 
13.954 
14.071 
 
14.147 
14.288 
8.044 
Notes. For each model in the first column, RMSE fit is reported in the corresponding cell. 
jaws subscript indicates the quantity estimated from jaws as opposed to true parameters. 
 
From Table 9 we determine that the Newton-Jaws model is more accurate than either Walras 
or excess bids when jaws are used to estimate excess demand slopes (Newton RMSE of 
11.877, 7.919, and 8.044 versus excess bids RMSE of 19.638, 10.042, and 13.954, respectively, 
and Walras RMSE of 21.121. 10.468, and 14.288, respectively), and similar but slightly less 
accurate when jaws are used to estimate excess demand. In the latter case, Newton-Jaws is a 
bit more accurate than Walras (Newton RMSE is lower except at call 2) . Newton is slightly 
worse than excess bids when both excess demand and its slope are jaws-estimated, and 
slightly better than Walras except at call 2. Thus, Newton-Jaws fit is similar to both of these 
alternatives. 
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In other words, the empirical variant of Newton performs at least as well as alternative 
empirical models. Since at the same time, Newton predictions are much more precise than 
those of the alternatives, Newton overall performance is strictly better. ∎  
An explanation of the accuracy differences among the three models when comparably 
evaluated can be provided by adding an assumption about the subjects’ bidding strategies.  
Given the nature of the bidding strategies as postulated by Jaws, the different measures bring 
different information content to the model as follows. 
Excess demand provides no direct information about the distance of the price from the 
equilibrium price. The excess demand measure as contained in the parameters evaluated at a 
price, contains only the qualitative information in the sign of the excess demand, which 
suggests an upward or downward movement. By contrast, excess bids reflect behaviors and 
contain limited information about excess demand as well as some information about the 
distance from the equilibrium price. However, the bids and asks order flow can also reflect 
“cheap talk”, unrealistic expectations, attempted signals and other complex phenomena, so 
the quality of the information when aggregated can be poor. Under an assumption about the 
nature of tenders, the excess bids can contain information about the sign of the excess 
demand as well as limited information about the excess demand slope. Specifically, if traders 
tend to restrict bids and asks to those for which values reside within a common, fixed interval 
of the price, then as predicted by the Jaws model, the total number of bids or asks placed will 
increase with the inverse of the respective slopes. Thus, according to the model, the relative 
numbers of bids over asks contain more information about limit values than just excess 
demand.   
The difference of information about limit values differentiates the information content 
supplied to a model by the two variables, excess bids and excess demand, and their 
integration by the Newton-Jaws. The information in excess bids is indirect since it depends on 
the consistency with which bidders submit bids and asks given their incentives and the excess 
bids model does not have the information needed to produce a calculation. By contrast, in the 
Newton-Jaws the information about limit values exists directly and separately to be used by 
the model. Thus, the key information about both excess demand and slopes of the demand 
37 
 
and supply is contained in the Jaws-Newton model.25 Given the microstructure of the price 
determination in the call markets the information is sufficient to provide a prediction of both 
direction and magnitude of price movement towards the competitive equilibrium. 
4.3 Individual Preference over Multiple Calls 
As is clear from the data, the market prices have a tendency to increase throughout the 
experiment. The pattern of increases appears to be due to the initial conditions that have 
prices starting well below the equilibrium levels and an upward shift of the equilibrium price 
about the middle period of the experiment. The increasing prices have implications about 
possible buyer and seller expectations. A natural place to look for the effect of expectations is 
in the multiple-call structure of the market. In particular, buyers could show a preference for 
the first call where prices are relatively low compared to the second call and the seller 
behaviors could reflect the same beliefs and respond with the opposite behavior.  
Result 8 provides elements of support for the role of expectations. It also reports that total 
volume is greater in the first call than in the second, a phenomenon for which we have no 
explanation. 
Result 8. Market volume differs across calls with the first call exhibiting more volume than the 
second. Buyer behavior reflects a buyer preference for the first call and seller behavior 
reflects a seller preference for the second call. The preferences are captured by asymmetries 
in proportion of buyers who trade and proportion of sellers who trade in the first versus 
second call. 
Support. We computed several characteristics of the trading activity, reported in Table 10. 
The numbers there are averages across all experiments. 
  
                                                          
25
 Table 9 shows how the goodness of fit of the Newton regression (7) changes as actual parameter values are 
replaced with their data-driven estimates See also Table 14 in Appendix A. 
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Table 10: Average statistics on call preference 
Call Variable Before Shift After Shift Overall 
1 % of period volume 
traded 
65.32 70.59 67.91 
- % active buyers  45.48 45.24 45.37 
- % active sellers  41.30 42.19 41.73 
- Bid-ask arrival rate 2.04 2.35 2.19 
2 % active buyers  41.78 38.61 40.23 
- % active sellers  39.55 37.26 38.43 
- Bid-ask arrival rate 0.71 1.30 1.00 
Notes. The numbers in the table are averages across all experiments.  % active buyers (sellers) in a call 
is the percentage of buyers (sellers) who submitted at least one order in a call relative to the total 
number of such traders in the period of two calls. As traders may submit orders at both calls, the sum 
of percentages may differ from 100. Bid-ask arrival rate is the difference in the arrival rates of bids and 
asks in the last 30 seconds before the call. 
Table 10 shows two things. First, as measured by percentage of the total volume traded in a 
period, there is a preference for the first call over the second one, with about 68% of the 
period volume traded at the first call. 
Second, buyers are more active than sellers: they submit relatively more orders at each call 
and do it more often. Two indicators show this: the percent of active buyers (or sellers) and 
the bid-ask arrival rate. The former equals the percentage of traders (buyers or sellers) 
submitting at least one order in a given call relative to the total number of such traders in the 
period (of two calls). The bid-ask arrival rate is a jaws-based estimated of excess demand used 
in Subsection 4.2. According to both indicators, buyers are more active than sellers, especially 
at call 1 (two-sided Mann-Whitney p=0.004 for the normalized buyer vs. seller share at call 1). 
Thus even crude measures of activity show that buyers and sellers behave quite differently. 
This difference becomes more apparent in data reflecting the order book dynamics, e.g., the 
estimated jaws. ∎ 
4.4 Robustness Check: Newton Applied to Zero-intelligence Robots 
In order to check the robustness of our main result, the Newton-like price dynamics across 
calls, we also simulated artificial data using zero-intelligence robots (see, e.g., Gode and 
Sunder (1993), Cason (1992)). From the analysis of zero-intelligence trades, described below, 
we conclude that Newton is a property of institution rather than an outcome of strategic 
interaction, and is directly related to convergence towards the competitive equilibrium. 
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The simulations were done as follows. We ran 512 replications of each of pre-shift and post-
shift experimental setting. In each replication period, there are 2 calls, and zero- intelligence 
buyers and sellers make random bids and asks as follows. Buyer bids for each unit are uniform 
from [110, unit value]. Seller asks for each unit are uniform from [unit cost, 250]. The unit 
values and costs are exactly as used in Sessions 5-7 of the experiment (see Table 2). 
Each of 15 buyers (three buyers for each of 5 buyer types) submits independent bids for all 6 
units. Each of 15 sellers (three sellers for each of 5 seller types) submits independent asks for 
all 6 units.26 At the first call, price and trade volume are determined based on the orders in 
the book as in the experiment. Then buyers and sellers make random bids and asks for the 
remaining units. At the second call, price and trade volume are determined based on the 
orders in the book, and the replication period ends. 
Since bidding is completely random, only the price dynamics across calls are studied. The 
randomness also precludes the use of bid/ask arrival rates as a measure of revealed excess 
demand. Table 11 contains the main results based on the actual excess demand and its slope. 
Results using jaws-based slope estimates are reported in Table 17 in Appendix A. 
Table 11:  Estimation of Newton at each call, Zero-Intelligence data 
 
 Call 1 Call 2 
Regressor Dep. Var.: 𝑝∗ − 𝑝1 Dep. Var.: 𝑝2 − 𝑝1 Dep. Var.: 𝑝∗ − 𝑝2 
Intercept (δ0) 0.245* 6.979*** -1.045*** 
 (0.114) (0.288) (0.131) 
Newton part (δ1) -1.068*** -1.154*** -0.889*** 
 (0.016) (0.044) (0.012) 
H0: δ0 = 0, δ1 = -1 Rejected*** Rejected*** Rejected *** 
Notes.  Table lists OLS estimates of regression (8) terms for ZI data (N = 1024), shift fixed effects 
included with standard errors in parentheses.  The joint hypothesis H0: δ0 = 0, δ1 = -1 is tested.  
Significance codes: ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05 
 
Table 11 demonstrates Newton predictions are robust even when applied to agent bids 
produced by zero intelligence. In all of the estimations the coefficient at the Newton term in 
(8), 𝛿1, has correct negative sign. At the same time, we reject the null hypothesis of full 
consistency with Newton: the constant term 𝛿0 is significantly different from zero. This seems 
                                                          
26
 An equivalent representation is to assume that each buyer or seller only has 1 unit, and there are 90 buyers 
and 90 sellers. 
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to be due to the fact that tight convergence to competitive equilibrium (a necessary 
assumption for Newton adjustment to work) is lacking under random bidding. Nevertheless, 
note that price at the first call points towards equilibrium price from below (𝛿0 > 0), while 
price at the second call overshoots and points towards equilibrium from above (𝛿0 < 0). 
Importantly, the price movement indication (the Newton part) is towards equilibrium price in 
both cases. 
5 Conclusion 
This paper initiates an investigation of principles of price adjustment in experimental multiple-
call, multiple-unit markets. As such it extends other research challenged by the possibility that 
call markets might provide a tool that helps solve problems encountered in markets operating 
in field environments. The challenge is made complex by wide ranging institutional features 
that can be assembled in many different configurations to create alternative call market 
architectures. The strategy is to experimentally probe theories of how selected institutions 
work together.  
We report evidence that multiple calls, the shape of the associated order book and a natural 
profit-maximizing behavior of individual traders organize themselves to produce an underlying 
price discovery process similar to a powerful tool for finding solutions to systems of equations 
(the Newton method). 
More specifically, we ask two main general questions. 
(1) Do call market exchanges converge to the classical demand and supply? 
(2) Do major patterns of convergence follow those suggested by market jaws and 
Newton? 
We provide positive answers to both questions. Market behavior is captured by the 
competitive equilibrium model. The shape of the order book, captured by market jaws, 
reveals useful information about the slope of excess demand, which becomes part of the price 
change dynamics across calls. The change in the price follows the Newton method for solving 
equations remarkably closely and produces a Newton-Jaws model. While the Walrasian 
adjustment, which does not include slopes of excess demand, finds support in the data, 
structural tests of the two models demonstrate that the Newton-Jaws model provides a 
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better description of how the markets operate. At the same time, we conduct non-structural 
tests of the models like those that might be possible in field applications and find that the 
performance of both models is similar. Interestingly the performance of the two models in 
that testing environment is also similar to the excess bids model that has price changes 
predicted by the difference between the total of bids and asks. However, close examination of 
the excess bids model suggests that the reason for its predictive power resides in its close 
proximity to excess demand and the market jaws.  
Our results reveal a systemic compatibility between the self-organizing and coordinating 
features that emerge from individual behavior and the institutional features that guide it. The 
combination shows that a price discovery process can be approximated by the Newton 
method based on the order flow approximated by the market jaws. The question suggested is 
whether or not other market features can be combined with even more powerful tools to 
produce better market performance. Are there methods better than Newton when put to this 
purpose? What institutional modifications might be needed to establish compatibility? 
  
42 
 
References  
Asparouhova, E., Bossaerts, P., and Plott, C. R. 2003, ‘Excess demand and equilibration in 
multi-security financial markets: the empirical evidence’, Journal of Financial Markets, 
6(1):1–21.  
Bossaerts, P. and Plott, C. R. 2008, ‘From market jaws to the Newton method’, In: Charles 
R. Plott and Vernon L. Smith (eds.) Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, Vol. 
1, Elsevier B.V. 
Brewer, P., Cvitanic, J., and Plott, C. R. 2013, ‘Market Microstructure Design and Flash 
Crashes: A Simulation Approach’, Journal of Applied Economics 16(2): 223-250. 
Budish, E., Cramton, P., and Shim, J. 2015, ’The High-Frequency Trading Arms Race: 
Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response’. Forthcoming, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics. 
Cason, T. N. 1992, ‘Call market efficiency with simple adaptive learning’, Economics Letters, 
40:27–32. 
Cason, T. N. and Friedman, D. 1997, ‘Price formation in single call markets’, Econometrica, 
65(2):311-345. 
Cason, T. N. and Friedman, D. 1999, ‘Learning in a Laboratory Market with Random 
Supply and Demand’, Experimental Economics, 2:77-98. 
Cason, T. N. and Friedman, D. 2008, ‘A comparison of market institutions’, Handbook of 
Experimental Economics Results, 1:264-272. 
Cason, T. N. and Plott, C. R. 1996, `EPA's New Emissions Trading Mechanism: A Laboratory 
Evaluation', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 30:133-160. 
Easley, D. and Ledyard, J. O. ‘Theories of price formation and exchange in double oral 
auctions’. In ‘The Double Auction Market’, D. Friedman and J. Rust (Eds.), SFI Studies in 
the Sciences of Complexity, Proc. Vol. XIV, Addison-Wesley, 1993. 
Friedman, D. 1993, ‘How trading institutions affect financial market performance: some 
laboratory evidence’, Economic Inquiry, 21:410–435. 
Friedman, D., and Ostroy, J. 1995, ‘Competitivity in auction markets: an experimental and 
theoretical investigation, Economic Journal, 105:22-53. 
Garvin, S., and Kagel, J. 1994, `Learning in Common Value Auctions: Some Initial 
Observations.', Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 25: 351-372. 
Gjerstad, S. 2013, ‘Price dynamics in an exchange economy’, Economic Theory, 52(2):461–
500. 
Gode, D. K. and Sunder, S. 1993, ‘Allocative Efficiency of Markets with Zero Intelligence 
Traders: Market as a Partial Substitute for Individual Rationality’, Journal of Political 
Economy, 101(1):119–137. 
43 
 
Hirota, M., Hsu, M., Plott, C. R., and Rogers, B., 2005, ‘Divergence, Closed Cycles and 
Convergence in Scarf Environments: Experiments in the Dynamics of General 
Equilibrium Systems’, California Institute of Technology Working Paper 1239. 
Hoffmann, P. and van Bommel, J. 2011 ‘Transparency and Ending Times of Call 
Auctions: A Comparison of Euronext and Xetra’. LSF Research Working Paper Series, 
no. 11-09. 
Jamison, J. C. and Plott C. R. 1997, ‘Costly offers and the equilibration properties of the 
multiple unit double auction under conditions of unpredictable shifts of demand and 
supply’, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 32:591–612. 
Johnson, Alonzo, Hsing-Yang Lee, and Charles R. Plott (1988) “Multiple Unit Double Auction 
User's Manual,” Caltech HSS Working Paper # 676.  
Kagel, J. H. 2004, ‘Double auction markets with stochastic supply and demand schedules: 
Call markets and continuous auction trading mechanisms’. Advances in Understanding 
Strategic Behavior: Essays in Honor of Werner Guth, S. Hack, editor, Palgrave. 
McCabe, K. A., Rassenti, S. J., and Smith, V. L. ‘Designing a uniform price double auction: 
An experimental evaluation.’ In ‘The Double Auction Market’, D. Friedman and J. Rust 
(Eds.), SFI Studies in the Sciences of Complexity, Proc. Vol. XIV, Addison-Wesley, 1993. 
Noussair, C. N., Plott, C. R., and Riezman, R. G. 1995, ‘An Experimental Investigation of 
the Patterns of International Trade, American Economic Review, 85(3):462–91. 
Plott, C. R., and George G. 1992, `Marshallian vs. Walrasian Stability in an Experimental 
Market', Economic Journal, 102(412):437-460. 
Plott, C.R. and Peter Grey, 1990, “The Multiple Unit Double Auction,” Journal of Economic 
Behavior and Organization, 13(2):245-258.  
Plott, C. R., Roy, N., and Tong B. 2013, `Marshall and Walras, Disequilibrium Trades and the 
Dynamics of the Equilibration in the Continuous Double Auction Market’, Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization, 94:190-205 
Plott, C. R., and Smith, V. L. 1978. ‘An Experimental Examination of Two Exchange 
Institutions’, Review of Economic Studies, 45(1):133–153. 
Saari, D. 1985, ‘Iterative Price Mechanisms’, Econometrica, 53(5):1117–1131. 
Saari, D and Simon, C P 1978, `Effective Price Mechanisms', Econometrica, 46(5): 1097--1125. 
Sattethwaite, M, and Williams, S. ‘The Bayesian Theory of the k-Double Auction’. In ‘The 
Double Auction Market’, D. Friedman and J. Rust (Eds.), SFI Studies in the Sciences of 
Complexity, Proc. Vol. XIV, Addison-Wesley, 1993. 
Scarf, H. 1960, ‘Some Examples of Global Instability of the Competitive Equilibrium’, Inter- 
national Economic Review, 1(3):157–172 
44 
 
Selten, R. and Neugebauer, T. 2014, `Experimental Stock Market Dynamics: Excess demand, 
adaptation, and style investing in a call-auction with multiple multi-period lived assets'. 
Mimeo, University of Luxembourg. 
Selten, R. and Neugebauer, T. 2015, “Stock Market ‘Puzzles’ Observed in Experimental Call 
Auctions and Continuous Double Auction Market: a Comparison of the Two Market 
Institutions”, LSF Research Working Paper Series, University of Luxembourg.  
Smith, V.L., 1965, “Experimental Auction Markets and the Walrasian Hypothesis”, Journal of 
Political Economy, 73(4): 387-393. 
Smith, V.L., G.L. Suchanek and A.W. Williams (1988). “Bubbles, Crashes, and Endogenous 
Expectations in Experimental Spot Asset Markets.” Econometrica, 56(5) :1119–1151. 
Smith, V. L., Williams, A. W., Bratton, W. K., and Vannoni, M. G. 1982. ‘Competitive 
Market Institutions: Double Auctions vs. Sealed Bid-Offer Auctions’, American 
Economic Review, 72(1):58–77. 
Wilson, R. `On Equilibria of Bid-Ask Markets'. In `Arrow and the Ascent of Modern Economic 
Theory', G. Feiwl (Ed.), 375--414. UK: MacMillan, 1987. 
  
45 
 
A.  Additional estimation details 
The tables in this appendix supply additional estimation details for the results in Section 4. 
Table 12: Estimation of Supply/Demand slope revelation at each call by market jaws 
 
 S(p1) S(p2) 
Variable τ = best-fit τ = fixed τ = best-fit τ = fixed 
γ1 0.762*** 0.693***  0.823***  0.661***  
 (0.043) (0.064)  (0.029)  (0.046)  
𝑅𝑎𝑑𝑗
2  0.786 0.574 0.891 0.710 
H0 Rejected*** Rejected*** Rejected*** Rejected*** 
 D(p1) D(p2) 
Variable τ = best-fit τ = fixed τ = best-fit τ = fixed 
γ1 0.966*** 1.524***  1.024***  1.007***  
 (0.053)  (0.204)  (0.042)  (0.104)  
𝑅𝑎𝑑𝑗
2  0.751 0.326 0.809 0.468 
H0 Not Rejected Rejected* Not Rejected Not Rejected 
N 101 101 101 101 
Notes. Bootstrap -corrected estimates of regression (6) main terms and their standard errors in 
parentheses, using 10,000 replications. The null hypothesis H0: γ1 = 1 is bootstrap-tested.  
Significance codes: ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05 
 
Table 13: Estimation of excess demand revelation by jaws: convergence of bid-ask arrival 
difference to the true excess demand at each call. 
Regressor Dependent Variable: excess demand difference 
 Call 1 Call 2 
Asymptote (𝛾) 7.553** (2. 078) 3.892 (1.495) 
Origin (before shift) in     
Session 1 (β1) -24.149 (21.311) -11.248 (14.047) 
--2(β2)  4.646 (7.400) 3.900 (9.995) 
--3(β3) -36.411 (23.992) -14.288** (6.035) 
--4(β4) -21.962 (10.335) -1.566 (7.691) 
--5(β5) -48.856*** (9.753) -37.329** (8.710) 
--6(β6) -59.715 (26.315) -29.610 (18.642) 
--7(β7) -2.552 (9.997) 5.566 (11.489) 
Origin (after shift) in     
Session 1 (δ1) -35.620 (16.403) -4.644 (7.233) 
--2(δ 2) -40.581*** (9.558) -25.588*** (4.823) 
--3(δ 3) 11.672 (17.045) -6.205*** (3.225) 
--4(δ 4) -2.026 (8.555) -6.067 (7.715) 
--5(δ 5) -16.139 (13.864) -12.123 (8.176) 
--6(δ 6) -52.858* (14.688) -28.311** (7.781) 
--7(δ 7) -25.527** (9.998) -12.193* (6.433) 
N 94 94 
𝑅𝑎𝑑𝑗
2  0.614 0.547 
F-stat 12.570 9.774 
Notes. Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. Estimates are bootstrap- 
corrected for bias. Significance codes: ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05 
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Table 14: Estimation of Newton (7) at each call 
 
 Call 1, Dependent Variable p* - p1 
Regressor S, ED S, EDj 𝑆𝑗
𝑓𝑥
, ED  𝑆𝑗
𝑏𝑓
, ED 𝑆𝑗
𝑓𝑥
, EDj 𝑆𝑗
𝑏𝑓
, EDj 
δ1 -0.991** -0.523** -0.786*** -0.029 -0.139* -0.232*** 
 (0.090) (0.155) (0.094) (0.244) (0.080) (0.057) 
R2adj 0.922 0.073 0.707 0.343 0.01 0.112 
RMSE 6.142 21.121 11.877 17.780 21.850 20.670 
H0 Not reject Reject** Reject* Reject*** Reject*** Reject*** 
 Call 1, Dependent Variable p2 – p1 
Regressor S, ED S, EDj 𝑆𝑗
𝑓𝑥
, ED  𝑆𝑗
𝑏𝑓
, ED 𝑆𝑗
𝑓𝑥
, EDj 𝑆𝑗
𝑏𝑓
, EDj 
δ1 -0.441*** -0.258 -0.317* -0.007 -0.084** -0.089*** 
 (0.038) (0.088) (0.064) (0.104) (0.041) (0.032) 
R2adj 0.706 0.075 0.470 0.222 0.016 0.070 
RMSE 5.904 10.468 7.919 9.599 10.791 10.493 
H0 Reject*** Reject* Reject*** Reject*** Reject*** Reject*** 
 Call 1, Dependent Variable p* – p2 
Regressor S, ED S, EDj 𝑆𝑗
𝑓𝑥
, ED  𝑆𝑗
𝑏𝑓
, ED 𝑆𝑗
𝑓𝑥
, EDj 𝑆𝑗
𝑏𝑓
, EDj 
δ1 -1.070*** -0.747 -0.629* -0.874*** -0.381 -0.765 
 (0.049) (0.316) (0.103) (0.054) (0.222) (0.307) 
R2adj 0.955 0.079 0.708 0.909 0.029 0.097 
RMSE 3.171 14.288 8.044 4.488 14.668 14.147 
H0 Not reject Not reject Reject*** Reject* Reject** Not reject 
Notes. Bootstrap-corrected estimates of regression (7) terms with their standard errors using 10,000 
replications in parentheses. Notation: S is true slope, ED is true excess demand, j subscript stands for 
jaws-based, fx is using fixed book share for estimating jaws, bf is using best-fitted jaws.  The null of 
perfect Newton, H0: δ1 = -1 is bootstrap-tested. Significance codes: ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05 
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Table 15: Estimation of Newton (8) at each call 
 
 Call 1, Dependent Variable p* - p1 
Regressor S, ED S, EDj 𝑆𝑗
𝑓𝑥
, ED  𝑆𝑗
𝑏𝑓
, ED 𝑆𝑗
𝑓𝑥
, EDj 𝑆𝑗
𝑏𝑓
, EDj 
δ0 0.732 7.865*** 2.208*** 7.909 8.851*** 8.030*** 
 (0.455) (1.854) (0.783) (2.840) (1.887) (1.852) 
δ1 -0.975** -0.318** -0.750*** 0.002 -0.095* -0.200*** 
 (0.095) (0.137) (0.093) (0.248) (0.065) (0.043) 
R2adj 0.907 0.024 0.657 0.298 0.000 0.088 
H0 Not reject Reject*** Reject* Reject*** Reject*** Reject*** 
 Call 1, Dependent Variable p2 – p1 
Regressor S, ED S, EDj 𝑆𝑗
𝑓𝑥
, ED  𝑆𝑗
𝑏𝑓
, ED 𝑆𝑗
𝑓𝑥
, EDj 𝑆𝑗
𝑏𝑓
, EDj 
δ0 1.027 3.943*** 1.958*** 4.145 4.423*** 4.145*** 
 (0.610) (0.837) (0.580) (1.240) (0.918) (0.906) 
δ1 -0.421*** -0.158 -0.285* 0.001 -0.062* -0.073*** 
 (0.043) (0.080) (0.062) (0.100) (0.037) (0.036) 
R2adj 0.652 0.024 0.390 0.172 0.006 0.047 
H0 Reject*** Reject*** Reject*** Reject*** Reject*** Reject*** 
 Call 1, Dependent Variable p* – p2 
Regressor S, ED S, EDj 𝑆𝑗
𝑓𝑥
, ED  𝑆𝑗
𝑏𝑓
, ED 𝑆𝑗
𝑓𝑥
, EDj 𝑆𝑗
𝑏𝑓
, EDj 
δ0 0.113 3.619** 1.410** 0.152 4.090** 3.505* 
 (0.217) (1.319) (0.608) (0.383) (1.327) (1.356) 
δ1 -1.067*** -0.583 -0.611* -0.871*** -0.269 -0.624 
 (0.049) (0.305) (0.103) (0.055) (0.208) (0.307) 
R2adj 0.950 0.046 0.688 0.900 0.011 0.062 
H0 Not reject Not reject Reject** Reject* Reject*** Not reject 
Notes. Bootstrap-corrected estimates of regression (8) terms with their standard errors using 10,000 
replications in parentheses. Notation: S is true slope, ED is true excess demand, j subscript stands for 
jaws-based, fx is using fixed book share for estimating jaws, bf is using best-fitted jaws.  The joint 
hypothesis of perfect Newton,  H0: δ0 = 0, δ1 = -1 is bootstrap-tested. Significance codes: ***<0.001, 
**<0.01, *<0.05 
 
Table 16: Estimation of price dynamics using excess bids from the last 30 seconds before call 
 
 Call 1 Call 2 
Regressor Dep. Var.: 𝑝∗ − 𝑝1 Dep. Var.: 𝑝2 − 𝑝1 Dep. Var.: 𝑝∗ − 𝑝2 
Walras part (𝛽1) 0.863*** 0.408*** 1.480*** 
 (0.273) (0.132) (0.582) 
N 108 108 108 
𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸 21.260 10.529 14.071 
Excess bid hypothesis Not Rejected Not Rejected Not Rejected 
Notes. Bootstrap-corrected estimates of regression (10) terms (using 10,000 replications) with their 
standard errors in parentheses. The null hypothesis 𝐻0: 𝛽1 ≥ 0 vs. alternative 𝐻𝑎: 𝛽1 < 0 is 
bootstrap-tested. Significance codes: ***<0.001, **<0.01, *<0.05  
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Table 17: Estimation of Newton at each call, ZI data 
 
 Call 1, Dependent Variable p* - p1 
Regressor S, ED 𝑆𝑗
𝑓𝑥
, ED 𝑆𝑗
𝑏𝑓
, ED 
δ0 0.245* 0.185 0.197 
 (0.114) (1.008) (01.118) 
δ1 -1.068*** -2.210*** -1.211*** 
 (0.016) (0.042) (0.027) 
H0  Reject*** Reject*** Reject*** 
 Call 1, Dependent Variable p2 - p1 
Regressor  S, ED 𝑆𝑗
𝑓𝑥
, ED 𝑆𝑗
𝑏𝑓
, ED 
δ0 6/979*** 6.915*** 6.928*** 
 (0.288) (0.288) (0.288) 
δ1 -1.154*** -2.392*** -1.312*** 
 (0.044) (0.094) (0.054) 
H0  Reject*** Reject*** Reject*** 
 Call 1, Dependent Variable p* - p2 
Regressor S, ED 𝑆𝑗
𝑓𝑥
, ED 𝑆𝑗
𝑏𝑓
, ED 
δ0 -1.045*** -1.642*** -1.168*** 
 (0.131) (0.129) (0.132) 
δ1 -0.889*** -1.213*** -0.885*** 
 (0.012) (0.016) (0.012) 
H0 Reject*** Reject*** Reject*** 
Notes. Table lists OLS estimates of regression (8) terms for ZI data (N = 1024), shift fixed effects 
included, with standard errors in parentheses. Notation:  S is true slope, ED is true excess demand, j 
subscript stands for jaws-based, fx is using fixed book share for estimating jaws, bf is using 
best=fitted jaws. The joint hypothesis H0: δ0 = 0, δ1 = -1 is tested. Significance codes: ***<0.001, 
**<0.01, *<0.05 
 
B  Instructions emailed to the participants 
Experiment Overview 
There are two types of participants on the public market (labeled ‘Market X’): public buyers 
and public sellers. The public buyers place orders to buy and public sellers place orders to sell 
in the public X market. Public buyers have odd IDs and public sellers have even IDs. 
The experiment uses a currency called “francs”. The exchange rate between francs and real 
money that you get paid is fixed and will be announced at the start of the experiment.  
The experiment consists of several 6-minute periods. Periods are independent from each 
other, and your payment is based on your total earnings in all periods. This means that you 
should try making profit in each period, but if you make a mistake and lose in some periods, 
you’ll have a chance to recover in future periods.  
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Before the actual experiment begins, there will be three low-paid practice rounds. If you are 
consistently losing money during the practice rounds, you will be declared bankrupt and the 
system will block you from further participation.  
You have been guaranteed a minimum, but you will receive it only if you participate for the 
full duration of the experiment.  
Prices and Calls 
All prices are determined at (and only at) the time of market calls. In each period, there are 
two market calls. One is at 1.5 minutes after a period begins and one is at 4.5 minutes. During 
the period, the order book of the public X market accumulates buy and sell orders from public 
buyers and public sellers, but trade in the public X market can only happen at a market call. If 
you trade, it will happen at the market price, not the price that you state in your orders. 
At each call, all buy and sell orders in the order book are simultaneously considered and a 
market price is established. It is determined as follows: 
1. Based on all orders in the book, the system sorts buy orders by their respective prices 
per unit from high to low. Sell orders are sorted by their respective prices per unit from 
low to high. 
2. The system matches the two sorted series selecting all pairs for which the purchase 
price is greater than the sale price, and stops at the last pair for which this is true.  
3. The market price is calculated midway between the last accepted (the lowest filled) buy 
order and the last accepted (highest filled) sell order. Except for ties, all buy orders with 
prices above the market price will trade at the market price. All sell orders with prices 
below the market price will trade at the market price. All other orders will remain 
unfilled.  
This means that if your buy order has a price below the market price, it won’t trade. Similarly, 
if your sell order has a price above the market price, it won’t trade. However, your order may 
change the expected market price, if once inserted in the sorted series it changes the 
intersection point (the last pair of matched orders where the purchase price is greater than 
the sale price). 
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Ties happen when there are several orders at the same price per unit in the order book and 
the total quantity demanded at the market price does not match the total quantity supplied at 
that price. In this case, the orders at the market price are filled in the first come first served 
manner as long as there is a match. 
If all this sounds too technical, just remember that the market price is based on all orders 
present in the book at the time of the call, and trade only happens at the call.  
You can always see the current market price if it exists (based on the orders currently present 
in the book) in the Best Buy/Best Sell Offer columns. The number before the @ symbol 
indicates the total number of units available at the corresponding Best Buy/Best Sell price. 
The first period will have an additional 5 minutes before the first call so you have time to 
figure out what to do. The end of the experiment will be announced without warning after the 
last period. 
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Information for Buyers 
If you are a PUBLIC BUYER (an odd ID number): you will buy units in the public X market and 
collect the values in your Value Opportunities List, just like a middleman buying in one and 
selling in the other.  
Profit on unit = Value Opportunity of unit - Price paid for unit in the public X market. 
You can lose money if you pay a price in the X market that is higher than your value for the 
unit, so make sure to look up your Value Opportunities List before you buy. You can also miss 
an opportunity to make money if you do not buy enough in the public X market when it is 
profitable to you. Notice that if you submit a multi-unit order, your profit will likely be 
different for each consecutive unit, so you can lose if the total profit from a multi-unit order is 
negative.  
You cannot buy more than six units in each call, and if you run out of Values in your Value 
Opportunities List, all units in excess will be redeemed by the system at the end of the period 
at the worst possible price to you. 
Values in your Value Opportunities List can change and do expire (each has a time tag). 
Refresh the frame to see an updated time tag (no automatic update). You do not need to 
collect all of the values in your list just because they are there. Some can be bad deals, 
depending on the public X market so that they can cause you to lose money.  
At the end of the period your inventory is worthless. That is, if you simply spend money and 
accumulate units of X in your inventory at the end of a period, you will lose what you have 
spent. Neither francs nor inventory will store across periods, only your profits. 
Information for Sellers 
If you are a PUBLIC SELLER (an even ID number): You will short sell units in the public X market 
that you afterwards procure at a cost from your Cost Opportunities List. You are just like a 
middleman who short sells in one market, and then, after figuring out how much to deliver, 
buys back in the other market.  
Profit on unit=Price received for unit in the X market - cost of unit from your Cost 
Opportunities List 
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Your optimal strategy may seem a bit tricky, because it involves short selling. You should sell 
units in the public market before you actually have them. Of course, your inventory will go 
negative until you procure the units needed to cover your sales. Once you trade in the public 
X market, you should procure the units using your Cost Opportunities List to cover what you 
have sold. This strategy allows you to avoid the risk from trade, because if you did otherwise, 
i.e. first paid the cost of the units and then tried selling them in the public X market, you 
would be likely to lose money, as the market price might happen to be less than your cost and 
your units won’t sell.  
You can lose money if you sell in the X market at a price that is lower than your cost, so make 
sure to look up your Cost Opportunities List before your sell. You can also miss an opportunity 
to make money if you do not sell enough in the public X market when it is profitable to you. 
Notice that if you submit a multi-unit order, your profit will likely be different for each 
consecutive unit, so you can lose if the total profit from a multi-unit order is negative. 
You cannot short sell more than six units in each call, and if you run out of Costs in your Cost 
Opportunities List, all remaining standing units will be covered by the system at the end of the 
period at the worst possible price to you. 
Costs in the Cost Opportunities List can change and do expire (each has a time tag). Refresh 
the frame to see an updated time tag (no automatic update). You do not need to use all of the 
costs in your list just because they are there. Some can be bad deals, depending on the public 
X market.  
At the end of the period your inventory is worthless. That is, if you accumulate debt (i.e., 
negative inventory) at the end of a period, your cash on hand will be spent to cover it, so you 
will lose what you have earned in that period. Neither francs nor inventory will store across 
periods, only your profits. 
Practice and Demo  
Instructions for the trading technology and practice are available at URL 
It is in your best interest to understand how this program works. 
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Do not confuse the experiment and the demo. You cannot participate in the experiment from 
the demo page.  
It is possible that your computer will not be able to load the demo. If your computer can load 
the demo, then it can load the experiment. 
If you have any further questions, please email us at EMAIL 
 
